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Abstract
This thesis explores the extent of federal jurisdiction over a next generation environmental
assessment (EA) model proposed by Sinclair, Doelle and Gibson. Examining the jurisprudence
and literature, it analyses the scope of federal constitutional authority during the triggering,
information-gathering and analysis and decision-making stages of project, strategic and regional
assessment. A federal next generation EA law focused on impacts on areas of federal authority
could be upheld under various federal constitutional heads of power. Federal jurisdiction is most
important at decision-making, and authority to trigger an assessment should be based on the
low jurisdictional threshold of reasonable probability of federal effects. Where federal impacts
will occur or undertakings otherwise engage federal jurisdiction, authorities have broad
authority to consider all relevant impacts. Next generation EA’s emphasis on multijurisdictional
cooperation aligns with courts’ preference for cooperative federalism and therefore may make
courts more tolerant towards overlap, especially where cooperation occurs.
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I.

Introduction
1. Context and Objectives

Environmental assessment (EA)1 in Canada is in a state of flux. In recent years, federal EA has entered
the political spotlight, prompting widespread discussions of its purpose, its role in federal environmental
decision-making, its failings and ways to build on lessons learned during its nearly fifty years of practice.2
In 2012, the former Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper replaced the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA)3 with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
2012 (CEAA 2012),4 fundamentally altering certain core aspects of federal EA.5 Next, in 2019, the Liberal
government enacted the Impact Assessment Act (IAA).6 Perhaps most relevant for this thesis were two
major changes in the approach of federal EA adopted in CEAA 2012 and then under the IAA: the scope of
and the alteration of how projects and activities are subjected to federal EA requirements by shifting

There is no consensus in Canada or globally on assessment terminology. Both CEAA and CEAA 2012 refer to “environmental
assessment,” (EA), while the Impact Assessment Act refers to the process as “impact assessment” (IA) in order to reflect it
broader consideration of all environmental, socio-economic and health effects. Internationally, Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) is preferred,, along with the various other forms of impact assessment (social, health, economic, etc) (see,
e.g., International Association for Impact Assessment, “What is Impact Assessment” (October 2009), online: IAIA
<https://www.iaia.org/uploads/pdf/What_is_IA_web.pdf>). As with the IAA, the next generation EA model studied in this thesis
imagines a comprehensive scope, although for the sake of consistency with Sinclair et al.’s model this thesis adopts the term EA
throughout.
1

2

See, e.g.: Anna Johnston, “Imagining EA 2.0: Outcomes of the 2016 Federal Environmental Assessment Reform Summit”
(2016) 30 JELP 1 [“Imagining EA 2.0”]; Stephen Hazell, “Improving the Effectiveness of Environmental Assessment in Addressing
Federal Environmental Priorities” (2010) 20 JELP 214; Anthony Ho & Chris Tollefson, “Sustainability-based Assessment of
Project-related Climate Change Impacts: A Next Generation Policy Conundrum” (2016) 30 JELP 67; Rod Northey, “Fading Role
of Alternatives in Federal Environmental Assessment” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 41 [“Fading Role of Alternatives”]; Canada,
Environmental and Regulatory Reviews Discussion Paper (June 2017) at 7, online: Government of Canada
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/share-yourviews/proposed-approach/discussion-paper-june-2017-eng.pdf>.
3

SC 1992, c 37 [CEAA].

4

SC 2012, c 19 [CEAA 2012].

5

Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA as We Know It?” (2012) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 1 [“CEAA 2012”].

6

SC 2019, c 28, s 1 [IAA].

1

from a “triggering approach” to a “project list” approach, eliminating federal regulatory authority as a
gatekeeper to federal EA processes.7
As is discussed in Chapter II, the IAA introduces another set of shifts in federal EA that have
implications on federal jurisdiction, including the transition to broader “impact assessment” (IA) that
considers a broad range of positive and negative environmental, social, health and economic effects and
their distribution.8 During the years between CEAA 2012’s appearance among federal environmental
laws and the tabling of the IAA, Canada’s EA academic and expert community remained busy, with a
number of individuals and groups proposing various models of “next generation” EA to replace CEAA
2012 and its predecessor processes.9 Many shared common recommendations, such as broadening the
scope of factors considered to all socio-economic, health, cultural, environmental and economic, and
enacting mandatory regional and strategic assessments.10 Most of these recommendations are, to
varying degrees, based on a paper by Robert B. Gibson, Meinhard Doelle and A.J. Sinclair titled Fulfilling
the Promise: Basic Components of Next Generation Environmental Assessment.11
Among the different next generation EA models, and underlying the IAA, lurks a question about
the extent of federal jurisdiction over EA in Canada, and in particular federal authority to broaden the

7

CEAA, supra note 3, s 5; CEAA 2012, supra note 4, ss 13-15, 84(a).

8

IAA, supra note 6, s 22.

9

See, e.g.: Johnston, Imagining EA 2.0, supra note 2; Environmental Planning and Assessment Caucus (Canadian Environmental
Network), Achieving a Next Generation of Environmental Assessment Submission to the Expert Review of Federal Environmental
Assessment Processes (14 December 2016), online: RCEN
<http://rcen.ca/sites/default/files/epa_caucus_submission_to_expert_panel_2016-12-14.pdf> [“Expert Panel Submission”];
and Anna Johnston, West Coast Environmental Law Submissions on Next Generation Environmental Assessment (23 December
2016), online: West Coast Environmental Law <https://www.wcel.org/sites/default/files/publications/wcel-submissions-to-eapanel-final-16-12-23.pdf> [“WCEL Submission”].
10

Johnston, Imagining EA 2.0, ibid at 9-13; Environmental Planning and Assessment Caucus, Expert Panel Submission, ibid at
19-20, 30-34; and Johnston, WCEL Submission, ibid at 9-19.
11

Robert B. Gibson, Meinhard Doelle & A. John Sinclair, “Fulfilling the Promise: Basic Components of Next Generation
Environmental Assessment” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 25 [“Fulfilling the Promise”].

2

scope and application of assessment as per the next generation EA model. Neither the provinces nor the
federal government have exclusive jurisdiction over the environment, a broad subject matter that
touches on several heads of power of both provincial and federal governments.12 Powers over and
interests in environmental matters may overlap,13 and tension and conflict between the federal and
provincial governments feature prominently in Canadian federalism,14 especially with respect to natural
resources and the environment.15 Indeed, in September 2019, Alberta’s Lieutenant Governor in Council
referred two constitutional questions to the Alberta Court of Appeal respecting the constitutional
validity of the IAA and the Physical Activities Regulations.16 Backed by the provinces of Saskatchewan
and Ontario, Alberta is challenging federal authority to assess projects it describes as provincially
regulated, and argues that provincial authority to manage natural resources cannot be interfered with
by federal assessment and decision-making [IAA Reference].17 The case not only highlights tensions
between federal and provincial governments respecting environmental assessment and authority, but
also illustrates the need for answers. While ultimately a decision on the IAA Reference should answer
some questions respecting the scope of federal assessment authority, that decision will be based on the

12

Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3, [1992] 2 WWR 193 [Oldman] at 74;
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed supplemented (Toronto, Thompson Reuters: 2016), vol 1 at 30-20
[“Constitutional Law”]; Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique (Markham,
LexisNexis Canada Inc: 2008) at 52 [The Federal EA Process]; Jamie Benidickson, Environmental Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2009) at 30.

13

Patricia Fitzpatrick & A. John Sinclair, “Multi-jurisdictional environmental impact assessment: Canadian experiences” (2009)
29 Environ Impact Asses Rev 252 at 253 [“Canadian Experiences”].

14

Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, “Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy” in Herman Bakvis and
Grace Skogstad, eds Canadian Federalism (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2012) 2 at 4; Roy J. Romanow, “Federalism
and Resource Management” in J. Owen Saunders, ed. Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State: Essays from the Second
Banff Conference on Natural Resources Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 1 at 9.

15

Romanow, ibid at 1.

16

O.C. 160/2019 (Judicature Act, s 26); Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019-285.
Attorney General (Alberta) v Attorney General (Canada), Calgary Appeal No 1901-0276AC, Factum of the Attorney General of
Alberta, paras 122-26. The IAA Reference hearing concluded in February 2021. At the time of writing, a decision had not yet
been rendered.

17

3

scheme of the Act, whereas this thesis explores the extent of federal jurisdiction outside the constraints
of a particular legislative regime.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the question of federal jurisdiction over all aspects of next
generation EA at the project, regional and strategic levels. The outstanding questions it seeks to answer
are: what is the extent of federal jurisdiction to trigger project, regional and strategic assessments?
What is the scope of factors that authorities or panels can consider in those assessments? And what
constitutional parameters, if any, exist on federal decision-making in each tier of assessment? As a
result, its objectives are to: 1) identify the aspects and stages of next generation EA with jurisdictional
implications, and establish why those jurisdictional implications exist; 2) identify and examine the case
law and literature dealing with those or analogous aspects and stages in order to inform the analysis;
and 3) draw conclusions respecting the extent of federal jurisdiction over those aspects during each
stage of assessment, i.e., what project, regional or strategic assessments a federal authority could
trigger, what information the authority could consider in assessments, and the range of possible
outcomes of those assessments. It seeks to contribute to the academic literature on federal jurisdiction
to assess and make decisions respecting projects and activities that impact on areas of federal authority.
By delineating the outer limits of federal jurisdiction over next generation EA, and therefore what is
possible within those limits, it is hoped that this thesis will help inform the drafting of a next generation
federal EA law.
The thesis builds upon the seminal Supreme Court of Canada decision Friends of the Oldman River
Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) (Oldman),18 which considered the constitutional validity of the

18

Oldman, supra note 12.

4

Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order (EARPGO),19 an early predecessor to
the IAA. Writing for the majority, La Forest J. upheld the EARPGO as an adjunct of various federal
powers relating to environmental protection, as well as under the “residuary aspect” of the Peace,
Order and Good Government (POGG) head of power.20 However, Oldman left unanswered key questions
respecting federal authority over project, regional and strategic assessment. The EARPGO applied only
to projects with federal proponents, that receive federal funding, were located on federal lands, or that
may have had environmental effects on areas of federal responsibility, and it listed a more limited set of
factors to consider than the next generation EA model, which requires assessments to consider all
relevant information.21 Oldman also did not consider the extent of federal authority respecting regional
and strategic assessment.
Chapter II begins with a short history of EA in Canada in order to situate the discussion of
jurisdiction in a shared understanding of EA’s purposes, objectives and application, and then sets out the
constitutional and political context by describing Canadian federalism, the constitutional separation of
powers and the political sensitivities respecting environmental protection and resource management
that courts will be live to in division of powers cases. It then moves into a discussion of the next
generation EA model chosen for this thesis: a second paper by Sinclair, Doelle and Gibson about
implementing next generation EA22 was selected for the purposes of this discussion because it 1) is
related to and builds on the foundational Fulfilling the Promise model; and 2) clearly articulates “key

19

SOR/84-467 [EARPGO].
The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5, s 91; Oldman, supra note 12 at 74;
Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 17.1-2; Baier, Gerald. “Judicial Review and Canadian Federalism” in Herman Bakvis
and Grace Skogstad, eds, Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University
Press, 2002) 24 at 25.
21 EARPGO, supra note 19, ss 4, 6.
20

22

A.J. Sinclair, M. Doelle & R. B. Gibson, “Implementing next generation assessment: A case example of a global challenge”
(2018) 72 EIA Rev 166 [“Implementing Next Generation EA”].

5

components” of next generation assessment that provide a useful breakdown of the different ways
federal jurisdiction is implicated during the stages of assessment. The chapter describes the three main
“stages” of assessment (triggering, information gathering and analysis, and decision-making), and then
identifies those aspects or components of the next generation model that have jurisdictional
implications: sustainability, alternatives, tiered regional and strategic assessment, cumulative effects
and multijurisdictional collaboration.
Chapter III provides an overview of the steps in a constitutional division of powers analysis and
the main applicable doctrines, then situates the analysis within Canada’s “political constitution” by
examining trends in approaches to Canadian federalism issues, and describing the preference of the
courts and in the legal scholarship for a cooperative federalism approach to environmental governance.
Finally, Chapter IV examines the scope of federal jurisdiction over next generation project,
regional and strategic EA in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s findings in Oldman and other
relevant case law. It begins by analyzing the pith and substance of a next generation federal EA law and
under which heads of power it might be upheld, then walks through each stage of assessment for
project and regional and strategic assessment, discussing the likely scope of federal constitutional
authority during triggering, information-gathering and analysis, and decision-making, before
summarizing its main conclusions.
The thesis concludes that there need only be reasonable probability of federal effects, or a federal
role in the assessment, in order a federal authority to validly require an assessment. The scope of the
information and the scope of the project that may be considered in assessments is broad, and while
decisions must be in respect of a federal matter (such as a federal effect or federally-regulated project),
decision makers may consider all relevant information when making their decisions respecting the
6

federal matter. Similarly, federal regional and strategic assessments must be mainly in relation to
federal matters, but federal authorities have jurisdiction to regulate the pace and scale of impacts on
areas of federal jurisdiction and activities over which Parliament has constitutional authority. Therefore,
regional and strategic assessment decisions may incidentally affect the provincial sphere, such as natural
resource management. Whether and when a project, regional or strategic assessment decision intrudes
into a provincial matter such that it upsets the balance of power must be considered on a case-by-case
basis.

2. Methodology
This thesis approaches the question of federal jurisdiction over next generation EA through four
approaches: doctrinal, historical, interdisciplinary and cooperative federalism theory. The doctrinal
research analyses legislation and case law, primarily from the Supreme Court of Canada and appellate
courts, selected both through identification in the literature and subsequent cases, and through key
search terms and noting up. Case law searches were conducted in CanLii and Lexis Advance Quicklaw.
The constitutional research began with Hogg and a comprehensive examination of monographs on
constitutional environmental law in the University of Ottawa Law Library, and proceeded into research
of sources cited in those monographs and keyword searches in Google Scholar. Historically, the research
examines the history of assessment law and practice federally in Canada through comparison of legal
and policy instruments, and through case law and secondary sources found to refer to those
instruments. It also draws on the case law and secondary literature to understand the evolution of
approaches to Canadian federalism and current preference for a cooperative federalist model. The
methods used to research cooperative federalism included a review of books available through the
University of Ottawa, as well as key term searches in Google Scholar.
7

Finally, the research is interdisciplinary in that it draws on non-legal instruments and literature for
its analysis of the main components of next generation EA. Indeed, EA itself is interdisciplinary, relying
on sources such as physical and social sciences, health sciences and Indigenous knowledge for its
conduct; accordingly, much has been written on subjects like CEA and sustainability by non-legal
scholars.23 To achieve the first objective of identifying aspects of stages and aspects of next generation
EA of jurisdictional relevance, the research began with Sinclair et al.’s next generation EA model, then
moved onto a literature review of secondary sources on EA law and practice to more fully understand
the theoretical underpinnings of each aspect discussed in that paper. The literature review began with
works by authors referred to by Sinclair et al. to provide further clarification on the next generation EA
model. Where more context was required, the research used Google Scholar to identify further
literature on the same subject, for example, by using the search terms “sustainability assessment,”
cumulative effects assessment,” “regional assessment,” “strategic assessment,” and those terms in
combination with such others as “triggering,” “scope” and “outcomes.” Sources were chosen that
functionally align with the recommendations in the Sinclair et. al. paper and the Gibson et al. paper that
first sets out the next generation assessment model. From these sources, inductive reasoning was used
to make observations respecting aspects and stages of next generation EA and case law on EA and
identify analogous case law and relationships between the findings, while deductive and analogical
reasoning was used to apply the law to the next generation EA model and draw conclusions respecting
federal authority over it.

23

E.g., Robert B. Gibson, ed. Sustainability Assessment: Applications and Opportunities (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017)
[“Sustainability Assessment: Applications”]; Peter N. Duinker & Lorne A. Greig. “The Impotence of Cumulative Effects
Assessment in Canada: Ailments and Ideas for Redeployment” (2006) 37 Envtl Mgmt 153 [“Impotence”].

8

In the analysis, the thesis uses a combination of hypothetical scenarios and real examples as fact
patterns. For the analysis of the extent of federal jurisdiction, it provides examples of existing projects as
well as hypothetical scenarios from the literature, and it also identifies new hypothetical scenarios
pieced together from different experiences. For regional assessment (RA), it uses the federal RA in
Ontario’s Ring of Fire (the Ring of Fire RA)24 as the basis of its analysis because of the significant
provincial interests in the region (in particular, the significant mineral interests). For strategic
assessment (SA), the analysis looks at the Strategic Assessment of Thermal Coal Mining (SATCM)25
because the assessment seeks to explore an activity (mining) over which the provincial legislatures have
jurisdiction, raising interesting questions respecting the extent of federal authority to trigger the
assessment, the range of information it may consider in it, and potential outcomes.

Government of Canada, Regional Assessment in the Ring of Fire Area, online: Canadian Impact Assessment Registry
<https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/evaluations/proj/80468>.
25 Government of Canada, Draft terms of reference for conducting a strategic assessment of thermal coal mining, online:
Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/transparency/consultations/draftterms-reference-conducting-strategic-assessment-thermal-coal-mining.html>.
24

9

II.

Federal EA and the Constitutional Context

This chapter sets the stage for the analysis in Chapter III by examining what EA is, Canada’s model of
federalism and the constitutional division of powers, and the current case law respecting EA to date. It
begins by examining the fundamental objectives of EA and different theories about its purpose and its
role in environmental decision-making, then describes the history of its application federally, including
the IAA and the next generation EA model of Sinclair et al. It then shifts to the constitutional context,
exploring Canada’s division of constitutional powers, how the courts and literature wrestle with
Canadian federalism, and federal jurisdiction over the environment and EA. In the last section, it applies
the law respecting federal constitutional authority over the environment and EA to identify those
aspects of next generation EA with that raise constitutional questions currently unresolved by the
courts.

1.

Background
a) What EA is

Environmental assessment has been described as a process designed to “look before you leap” into
decisions that may have environmental implications.26 While there are different perspectives on what
EA is and what its objectives are or ought to be, there is widespread agreement that EA at its core is a
process for informing environmental decision-making, and an opportunity to justify those decisions.27

26

William A. Tilleman, “Environmental Assessment” in Environmental Law and Policy, 3rd edition, Elaine Hughes, Alastair R.
Lucas and William A. Tilleman eds (Toronto; Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2003) 215 at 215; Jocelyn Stacey, “The
Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law Implications of Harper’s Environmental Assessment Legacy” (2016) 21 Rev Const
Stud 1 at 169.
27

D. Paul Emond, Environmental Assessment Law in Canada (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery Ltd., 1978; Benidickson,
Environmental Law, supra note 12 at 249; Stacey, Ibid; Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act: An Overview (Canada, 2003, updated 2011) at 3; Robert B. Gibson et al., Sustainability Assessment: Criteria and
Process (London: Earthscan, 2005) at 15 [“Sustainability Assessment: Criteria and Processes”]; Neil Craik, “Transboundary
Environmental Assessment in Canada: International and Constitutional Dimensions” (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 107 at 127.

10

Doelle argues that CEAA, the first federal EA statute in Canada, was “designed around the basic idea that
all federal decision makers, in principle, should consider the environmental implications of decisions
they were being asked to make about proposed projects.”28 The Supreme Court of Canada reiterated
this understanding of EA in Oldman, finding that EA is “essentially an information gathering process in
furtherance of a decision-making function within federal jurisdiction.”29 In Peace Valley Landowner
Association v British Columbia, the Federal Court of Appeal, citing La Forest J. in Oldman, held that the
purpose of CEAA 2012 was environmental protection.30 Expanding on the definition set out in Oldman,
Rothstein J. for the Supreme Court in MiningWatch Canada described the former CEAA as “a detailed
set of procedures that federal authorities must follow before projects that may adversely affect the
environment are permitted to proceed.”31 This latter point is key, as without a resulting decision one
may argue that assessment has no purpose. While EA processes are usually separate from regulatory
decision-making, EA is inherently about gathering and analyzing information, and tends to result in a
report for EA decision-makers and to guide regulatory decisions.32
Intended to help foster sustainable development,33 EA seeks to predict the potential
consequences of proposed human activity, mitigate or avoid any adverse effects, and promote stated
benefits.34 A planning tool, EA is designed to anticipate potential future unwanted consequences rather
than react to them after they have occurred, and to bridge the gap between environmental planning

28

Doelle, CEAA 2012, supra note 5 at 4.

29

Oldman, supra note 12 at 75.

30

Peace Valley Landowner Association v British Columbia (Environment), 2016 BCCA 377, para 34.

31

MiningWatch Canada v Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans, 2010 SCC 2, 2010 CarswellNat 55, para 1 [MiningWatch].

32

Arlene Kwasniak, “Environmental Assessment, Overlap, Duplication, Harmonization, Equivalency, and Substitution:
Interpretation, Misinterpretation, and a Path Forward” (2010) 20 J Envtl L & Prac 1 at 14-15.

33

Stacey, supra note 26 at 170.

34

Ibid at 170-71; Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO), “The Federal Environmental Assessment and
Review Process (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987) at 1.

11

and project-level decision-making.35 As a forum for environmental planning and decision-making, EA
acts as a check on development by requiring proponents and authorities to consider its environmental
and socio-economic costs.36 As the Federal Court found in Greenpeace Canada v Canada37 held:
The most important role for a review panel is to provide an evidentiary basis for decisions that
must be taken by Cabinet and responsible authorities. The jurisprudence establishes that
gathering, disclosing, and holding hearings to assemble and assess this evidentiary foundation is
an independent duty of a review panel, and failure to discharge it undermines the ability of the
Cabinet and responsible authorities to discharge their own duties under the Act.38
Of course, EA can have substantive objectives, such as “providing a forum for explicitly considering
whether the risks of projects are acceptable and whether proposals reflect the best use of our land and
resources.”39 Other benefits include avoiding, reducing or eliminating adverse effects and risks,
providing the public with opportunities to input into decision-making, and cost-savings.40 In other words,
EA serves to inform and strengthen decisions at the project level as well as at the policy, planning and
program levels.41
Experts argue, however, that EA only achieves its purposes if it is wide-ranging. For example, an
objective of EA should be to consider a broad range of potential effects, including the direct and indirect
project-level and cumulative biophysical environmental, social, economic, health and cultural impacts of
concern to the public, other participants and interested parties.42 By adding to the assessment the
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identification of the proposal’s purposes, and a comparative evaluation of its alternatives and
alternative means of carrying it out, assessment authorities enhance the credibility and sustainability of
environmental decision-making.43 Assessments should also occur across the lifespan of an undertaking,
from the early planning stages through to operation and decommissioning.44 Gibson identifies the three
main principles of effective EA as ensuring attention to the integration of biophysical, social and
economic effects, selecting the most desirable option from among the alternatives for maximizing
benefits while avoiding or mitigating adverse effects, and improving the “consistency, impartiality,
transparency and accountability” of decision-making.45 To these may be added promotion of
sustainability, facilitating collaboration and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, coordination across
and among governments, and encouraging meaningful public engagement.46 As Winfield observes, the
goal of EA is to “provide a more integrated picture of potential project impacts of projects [sic] than
could be provided by the existing, institutionally and legislatively fragmented, environmental regulatory
regime.”47
Opinion differs on how many stages EA has. In Oldman, La Forest held that EA is comprised of
two primary components: information gathering and evaluation of the potential environmental
consequences of a proposed undertaking, and decision-making.48 In addition to these, Chalifour has
identified the initial trigger that causes an environmental assessment to be initiated, and post-decision

43

Northey, CEAA and EARPGO, ibid at 1; Gibson, Sustainability Assessment: Criteria and Processes, supra note 27 at 24.

44

Gibson, Sustainability Assessment: Criteria and Processes, ibid at 16.

45

Robert B. Gibson, “In full retreat: the Canadian government’s new environmental assessment law undoes decades of
progress” (2012) 30 Impact Assess Proj Apprais 179 at 181 [“In Full Retreat”].
46

Mark Winfield, “Decision-Making, Governance and Sustainability” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 129 at 130; Stacey, supra note 26
at 170; Benidickson, Environmental Law, 3rd ed, supra note 12 at 254.

47

Winfield, ibid at 134.

48

Oldman, supra note 12 at 71.

13

follow-up and monitoring.49 The IAA adds yet another stage to the assessment: the planning phase.50
Doelle suggests there are three main stages in an assessment that have jurisdictional implications: when
triggering an assessment, when scoping the project and the assessment, and in decision-making.51
Indeed, final decisions to approve projects include the imposition of conditions respecting mitigation
and follow-up program,52 meaning that from a jurisdictional perspective decision-making and follow-up
can be considered under the same lens. Similarly, the primary focus of the planning phase under the IAA
is the scope of information that will be considered in the assessment,53 meaning that it can be
categorized within the first of La Forest’s identified components: information-gathering and analysis. As
a result, the three stages of EA this paper will examine are 1) triggering, 2) information gathering and
analysis, and 3) decision-making. Federal jurisdiction with respect to each stage is discussed in more
detail in Chapter IV for project, regional and strategic assessment.

b) From EA to IA: History of federal EA
First required of federal departments in 1973,54 EA has been informing federal decisions for over four
decades. It emerged in response to a growing awareness in the 1960s that “the institutionally and
legislative fragmented approach to the management of environmental issues was unable to provide
comprehensive perspectives on the potential environmental impacts of proposed projects.”55 Initially,
the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) was a federal policy initiative, supported by

49
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the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO).56 In 1984, the Governor in Council issued
the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order (EARPGO),57 under the authority of
the Government Organization Act.58 EARP and the EARPGO were intended as planning processes rather
than regulatory reviews, designed to address potential environmental effects of proposals and any
resulting changes that those effects may have on socio-economic conditions.59 The process under both
began with an initial assessment of the proposal’s potential environmental effects and their significance,
followed by a decision that the proposal would not result in any adverse effects and could proceed
without an assessment, or a finding that the proposal might result in significant adverse environmental
effects, in which case an assessment was required.60 “Proposals” included “initiatives, undertakings and
activities for which the Government of Canada has a decision making responsibility,” including both
physical works and policies, plans, programs and agreements.61 While the EARPGO was primarily about
informing decisions, there was a clear intention to also allow for the alteration or abandonment of
projects where unacceptable effects could not be mitigated or avoided.62
In 1992, the federal government enacted CEAA, entrenching EA processes in legislation for the
first time. As a planning tool, CEAA’s two main purposes were to minimize or avoid adverse
environmental effects, and to incorporate environmental factors into federal decision-making.63 As with
the EARPGO, federal action was the entry-point to an assessment. CEAA required assessments for
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projects and activities that required federal approval, occurred on federal lands, received federal
funding or had a federal proponent.64 Once an assessment was triggered in one of these ways, the
authority had to consider any environmental effects of the project, including the health, socio-economic
or cultural effects of any environmental changes.65 Like EARPGO, a decision could result in an approval,
an approval with conditions, or a rejection of the proposal.66
Federal EA underwent a significant transformation in 2012, with the passage of CEAA 2012. A key
jurisdictional change this statute brought to the practice of federal EA was the shift from the regulatory
triggering approach to a project-listing approach, which only required projects to undergo assessment if
they were described in regulations, occurred on federal lands or were designated by the Minister. It also
narrowed the factors that could be considered to only the biophysical effects of a project that were
within federal jurisdiction and eliminated the consideration of alternatives, which.67 As a result of these
changes, federal EA was no longer a comprehensive process for looking at the full range of potential
integrated and cumulative effects, but a restricted regulatory tool for looking exclusively at the narrow
effects that fall under the federal Parliament’s regulatory and constitutional authority.68 By restricting
what factors may be considered in an assessment (along with restricting what projects are assessed and
the ability of the public to participate), CEAA 2012 failed to meet what Stacey argues is a basic rule-oflaw standard of EA: “the federal decision-maker must now base his or her decision on a restricted
understanding of environmental effects,” and it is “unlikely that such a narrow understanding of

64
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environmental effects can provide a sufficient basis for determining whether a project can be justified in
the circumstances.”69
Beyond the implications CEAA 2012 had on EA efficacy and fairness, it also had likely unintended
implications on the jurisdictional bases of federal EA. Unintended, because many of the changes made
through CEAA 2012 appear to be designed to limit federal assessment to a narrow view of the federal
Parliament’s constitutional authority, such as the restriction of the factors to consider to select ones
within federal jurisdiction.70 But while CEAA 2012 carefully grounded what occurs during an assessment
in federal jurisdiction, it abandoned what many considered to be a jurisdictional gatekeeper that only
subjected projects to assessment under CEAA and the EARPGO if those projects involved an exercise of
federal authority. Of course, it is important not to conflate constitutional authority to enact valid federal
laws with an exercise of statutory authority. It is s. 91 of The Constitution Act, 1867, not statutes enacted
under its section 91 heads, that confers jurisdiction on Parliament. Therefore, when CEAA triggered an
assessment on the basis that the project or activity required a federal approval, that trigger was not a
jurisdictional one, but a regulatory one. However, a statutory requirement to obtain federal approval
arguably provides greater confidence that the matter falls within federal jurisdiction than the “project
list” approach employed under CEAA 2012. Retained under the IAA,71 the project list approach
designates for assessment projects that fall within categories presumed to usually involve federal
jurisdiction, regardless of the specifics of the triggered projects themselves,72 such as location or design.
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The latest stage in the evolution of federal EA is the IAA, which came into force on August 28,
2019. While the focus of this thesis is on federal jurisdiction over next generation EA generally, the IAA
contains a number of aspects of next generation EA that make it a helpful example to turn to
throughout the analysis. For starters, the IAA broadens the scope of factors to consider in assessments
to all positive and negative environmental, social, health and economic factors.73 It requires assessments
and decision-makers to consider the extent to which the project contributes to sustainability,74 the
intersection of sex and gender with other identity factors (GBA+),75 and the extent to which the project
helps or hinders Canada’s ability to meet its environmental and climate obligations.76 It also allows for
regional and strategic assessments with or without provincial cooperation.77 On the other hand, the IAA
retains the project list approach employed under CEAA 2012,78 weakening the link between federal
constitutional authority and IA. Given the broadening of scope of assessment and retention of the
project list approach, the issue of federal constitutional authority over assessment is a particularly live
question at the time of writing, especially as the first assessments triggered under it unfold.

c) Next generation EA
It would be tempting to cite disappointment with CEAA 2012 as the sole catalyst for next generation EA
proposals, but in fact calls for EA reform are arguably based as much in recognition of EA failings and
lessons learned under CEAA, the EARP and EARPGO, as well as in experiences from other jurisdictions.
Indeed, the authors of the next generation EA model used for the jurisdictional analysis in this paper
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claim that “[t]he history of Canadian environmental assessment has been a race between
accomplishment and disappointment.”79 Of chief concern is EA’s tendency to focus on mitigation and
avoidance of effects while presuming that projects will nonetheless be approved, despite residual harms
they may cause or the public’s long-term wellbeing.80 The almost exclusive focus on the project level,
rather than on strategic and regional assessments, has undermined the ability to effectively address
cumulative effects and broader policy issues, while even at the project level assessment has failed to
reflect a growing recognition of complex interactions in socio-ecological systems and increasingly
pressing needs to ensure progress towards sustainability.”81
To remedy the myriad of defects identified in federal EA processes, Sinclair et al propose the next
generation EA model as an integrated package of eleven “overlapping and interdependent” key
components.82 They are:83
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Sustainability as a core purpose;
Consideration of alternatives;
Integrated, tiered assessments at the regional, strategic and project levels;
Application of appropriate assessment streams;
Effective attention to cumulative effects;
Cooperation with other jurisdictions;
Co-governance with Indigenous nations;
Participation for the people;
Learning-oriented assessment;
Transparency and accountability; and
Ensuring contributions to sustainability throughout the lifespan of the project.
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That these components are to be viewed and applied as an integrated package with a strong legislative
foundation must be stressed.84 While the purpose of this thesis is to examine only those aspects
identified as having substantive jurisdictional implications, the teasing out of only some components is
not intended to detract from the other components or undermine the integration of the suite of
components. Also, not all components are within the power of the federal Parliament to achieve
unilaterally, such as collaboration with other relevant provincial and territorial authorities. Thus, while
the authors argue that “the preference is for participative and, to the extent possible, consensus-based
approaches” to assessment and decision-making,85 a strong federal role is required for situations where
consensus is not possible. Given the political reality of federal-provincial environmental relations,
federal jurisdiction may be essential for achieving the promise of next generation EA.

2.

Constitutional Context: Canada’s Unique Model of Federalism and Implications for
Next Generation Federal EA
a) The division of constitutional powers over the environment

Neither the provinces nor the federal government have exclusive jurisdiction over the environment,
perhaps owing to the lack of knowledge of or attention to environmental matters at the time Canada’s
original constitution,86 the British North America Act (BNA Act),87 was written.88 Not explicitly
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enumerated under the Constitution,89 the environment is a broad subject matter that touches on
several heads of power of both provincial and federal governments.90 In the Supreme Court of Canada
decision Oldman, the majority described the environment as “a constitutionally abstruse matter which
does not comfortably fit within the existing division of powers without considerable overlap and
uncertainty.”91 For example, the federal government has power over trade and commerce, navigation
and shipping, the sea coast92 and inland fisheries, Indigenous peoples and their lands, and criminal law,93
whereas the provinces have jurisdiction over forests, local works and undertakings, property and civil
rights,94 non-renewable natural resources, and the generation and production of electrical energy.95
Both levels of government are granted taxation powers,96 and the federal government has a residual
power to enact legislation “for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada” respecting matters
that the Constitution does not assign to the provinces (known as the POGG power).97 The federal
Parliament also has jurisdiction over ships, railways, canals, telegraphs, and undertakings “connecting
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the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province,”
including pipelines,98 as well as pollution originating in one province that has an external impact on
another province or internationally.99 According to Hogg, the most obvious sources of federal power
over the environment are criminal law, fisheries, navigation and shipping, coastal waters outside
provincial boundaries, international and interprovincial rivers, federal public lands, taxation, and
industries within federal jurisdiction (e.g., aviation, interprovincial and international transportation and
communication, nuclear power and banking).100 Doelle suggests that while the list of federal heads of
power related to the environment is longer, they tend to be more focused in nature than the provincial
powers.101 Benidikson agrees, noting that the federal trade and commerce power has failed to give rise
to broad federal environmental authority.102
In many cases, powers related to environmental matters overlap.103 For example, while the
provinces have jurisdiction over non-renewable resources, the federal government has legislative
authority over onshore minerals where they occur on or under federal public property, and privatelyowned minerals in the territories and the offshore.104 In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the

98

The Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20, s 92(10)(a). In Campbell-Bennett v Comstock Midwestern, [1954] SCR 207 and Sask
Power Corp v Trans-Can Pipelines, [1979] 1 SCR 297, the SCC held that pipelines that extend beyond limits of province falls
outside provincial jurisdiction. However, in Re Westspur Pipeline Co Gathering System, (1957) 76 CRTC 158 and Westcoast
Energy v Can, [1998] 1 SCR 322, the CRTC and SCC held that a pipeline that is local but connected to and operated as part of an
interprovincial system is outside of federal jurisdiction, and a distribution line that carries gas from the interprovincial trunk line
to the consumer has been held to be within provincial jurisdiction (Re National Energy Board Act, [1988] 2 FC 196 (CA)). The
courts have held that the connection or extension must be an operational connection, not merely physical (Hogg, Constitutional
Law, supra note 12 at 22.5).
99

Interprovincial Co-operatives v R, [1976] 1 SCR 477; Benidickson, Environmental Law, supra note 12 at 33-34.

100

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 30.20-21.

101

Doelle, The Federal EA Process, supra note 12 at 54.

102

Benidickson, Environmental Law, supra note 12 at 33.

103

Fitzpatrick & Sinclair, Canadian Experiences, supra note 13 at 253.

104

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 30.4.

22

constitutional validity of the Atomic Energy Control Act105 under the federal declaratory power under
section 92(10)(c), giving the federal Parliament responsibility over prospecting for, mining, producing,
refining, handling and marketing uranium.106 While the provinces have jurisdiction over forests, the
federal Parliament has legislative authority over forests on federal lands (such as national parks, military
reserves, and forests in the three territories), and forests as they relate to navigation (for example, log
booms on navigable waters) and fisheries (e.g., if logging debris harms fish or fish habitat).107 Federal
powers act as a limit on provincial authority over natural resources, meaning that a province may not
authorize obstructions on navigation or harm to fish habitat.108 Likewise, provincial Legislatures have
power over the generation and distribution of hydroelectricity because dams, generating stations and
distribution systems are “local works and undertakings” within s 92(10) of The Constitution Act, 1867,109
while on the other hand, the federal government has authority over dams under its power over
navigation and shipping.110 The federal power to make laws in relation to the sea coast and inland
fisheries extends to all fisheries in Canada, including those that do not cross provincial borders,111 and
includes authority to protect fish habitat, such as spawning grounds,112 but does not give the federal
Parliament general authority to regulate water pollution.113 Similarly, while as noted above the federal
Parliament has authority over the development and generation of nuclear power, the provinces have

105

SC 1946, c 37; now RSC 1985, c A-6.

106

Ontario Hydro v Ontario [1993] 3 SCR 327; see also Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 30.5-6.

107

Hogg, ibid at 30.11-12.

108

Queddy River Driving Boom Co. v Davidson, (1883) 10 SCR 222; Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 30.12.

109

Hogg, ibid at 30-18.

110

Smith v Ontario and Minnesota Power Co, [1918] OJ No 7, 44 OLR, para 20; Ibid at 30.28.

111

Hogg, ibid at 30.13.

112

Ward v Canada, [2002] 1 SCR 569, [2002] SCJ No 21, paras 32-33 [Ward].

113

R v Fowler, [1980] 2 SCR 213, [1980] SCJ No 58 [Fowler]; see also Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 30.16. It should
be noted that in R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 SCR 401, [1988] SCJ No. 23 [Crown Zellerbach], a majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld a federal law prohibiting dumping at sea, including in marine waters where the substance will
also pollute extra-provincial waters, under the POGG power.

23

power to make laws in relation to the “development, conservation and management of sites and
facilities in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy.”114 And while the
provinces have authority over mining, control of the import and export of commodities to and from
Canada is a federal responsibility that “provides considerable opportunity to affect the activities of any
industry, including mining, that is profoundly affected by import policies, and heavily engaged in export
trade.”115 This power stems from the federal Parliament’s authority over customs and excise laws, trade
and commerce, taxation and POGG,116 and the overlap between federal and provincial powers in
relation to mining were mirrored in the Australian case Murphyores Incorporated Pty. Ltd. v
Commonwealth of Australia (1976).117 In Murphyores, the High Court of Australia held that the
Australian federal power over exports includes the power to examine and put conditions on the
production of mineral sands, the control of which is generally a matter under state control.118 While the
question of federal authority to impose environmental conditions in relation to the exploration,
extraction or processing of natural resources remains unanswered by Canadian courts, Murphyores
provides some guidance on how the courts might decide the matter on Canadian soil.
Due to the overlapping, diverse and important nature of environmental protection, it is
considered to be an area of shared jurisdiction (see section 2, below, for a discussion of constitutional
doctrines that apply where overlap occurs).119 While one level of government cannot enact a law in

114

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 30.19.

115

Gibson, Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 88 at 62.

116

Gibson, Constitutional Jurisdiction, supra note 88 at 62, fn 43.

117

136 CLR. 1 (HC).

118

Ibid at para 29.

119

R v Chiasson, (1982), 66 CCC (2d) 195 (NBCA), aff'd [1984] 1 SCR 266 (SCC); British Columbia (Attorney General) v Lafarge
Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 23, [2007] 2 SCR 86 [Lafarge]; Hogg, Constitutional Authority, supra note 94 at 510; Barry C. Field &
Nancy D. Olewiler, Environmental Economics, 3rd ed. (Whitby: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2011), ch 15 at 3-4, online: Simon Fraser
University <http://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/Olewiler-Field_3rd-ed/Field%203Ce%20Final%20MS%20Ch15.pdf>; and
Doelle, The Federal EA Process, supra note 12 at 59.

24

relation to a matter over which the other level has exclusive jurisdiction, there may be another aspect
that the government can regulate.120 Gibson warns that while federal authority takes priority where
there is inconsistency, federal powers should not be assumed to be more significant than provincial
powers, such as where provincial jurisdiction over a matter is indisputable and federal jurisdiction is
debatable.121 At the same time, where the federal Parliament does have constitutional authority, such as
over fisheries or navigation, it has considerable powers in respect of environmental protection related
to that power.122
Courts have set limitations on federal authority to encroach on matters of provincial jurisdiction,
even when enacting legislation ostensibly under an enumerated head of power. In R v Fowler,123 for
example, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a provision of the Fisheries Act prohibiting discharging
logging debris into waters frequented by fish was ultra vires Parliament (invalid). Section 33(3) read:
No person engaged in logging, lumbering, land clearing or other operations, shall put or
knowingly permit to be put, any slash, stumps or other debris into any water frequented by fish
or that flows into such water, or on the ice over either such water, or at a place from which it is
likely to be carried into either such water.124
In that case, the appellant had been charged under the provision for causing debris to enter into salmon
habitat during the course of logging operations. Justice Martland, writing for the Court, upheld the trial
judge’s decision to acquit the Appellant. He held that the provision was overbroad, covering logging,
lumbering, land clearing and other operations, and prohibiting slash, stumps and other debris, did not
set out a threshold amount of debris, blanket-prohibited activities subject to provincial jurisdiction,
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covered waters and ice beyond just waters frequented by fish, and did not link the proscribed conduct
to any actual or potential harm to fisheries.125 Because the provision in question was not sufficiently
linked to harm to fisheries, and because of the lack of evidence that the proscribed actions would always
be harmful to fisheries, the Court held that it could not be upheld under the federal fisheries power.126
However, in the related case Northwest Falling Contractors Ltd. v R. (Northwest Falling),127 Martland J
went on to uphold a provision prohibiting the deposit of a deleterious substance into water frequented
by fish because the term “deleterious substance” was defined as something that was “deleterious to fish
or fish habitat or to the use by man of fish,”128 which provides a link between the prescribed conduct
and harm to fisheries. Since the impugned provision in Northwest Falling did relate to harm to fish (an
area within federal jurisdiction), Martland J distinguished it from Fowler and held that the provision was
intra vires the federal Parliament to enact (valid). Thus, attempts by the federal government to regulate
environmental matters must specifically relate to an impact on a valid head of power, rather than simply
refer to that power.

b) Federalism and the political constitution
While this thesis is about federal constitutional authority over next generation EA, any understanding of
the extent of federal authority would be impoverished without concurrent understanding of the broader
socio-political context of Canadian federalism within which the constitutional division of powers sits.129
In Canadian Western Bank, a majority of the Supreme Court described federalism as “the legal

125

Ibid, paras 22-23.

126

Fowler, supra note 113 at 8.

127

[1980] 2 SCR 292, [1980] SCJ No 68 at 301 [Northwest Falling].

128

Fisheries Act, RSC 1970, c F-14, s 33(11)(b).

129

W.R. Lederman, “Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods of Moderation” (1975) 53 Can B Rev 597
at 601 [“Unity and Diversity”]; William R. MacKay, “Canadian Federalism and the Environment: The Literature” (2004) 17 Geo
Int’l Envtl L Rev 25 at 28.

26

response… to the political and cultural realities” of Confederation-era Canada, “a legal recognition of the
diversity of the original members.”130 As a component of federalism, the division of powers “was
designed to uphold this diversity within a single nation” by conferring broad powers on the provinces
while ensuring national unity through assignment to the federal Parliament “powers better exercised in
relation to the country as a whole.”131 At Confederation as well as now, the “fundamental objectives of
federalism” are “to reconcile unity with diversity, promote democratic participation by reserving
meaningful powers to the local or regional level and to foster co-operation among governments and
legislatures for the common good.”132
When determining the extent of each order of government’s authority over next generation EA,
one must look beyond constitutional texts and jurisprudence to Canada’s “political constitution,” or the
“understood role of the federal and provincial governments.”133 This political constitution “forms a kind
of gloss upon the legalities of federal-provincial relations,” as “perceived provincial sensitivities” and
intergovernmental relations tend to be critical factors in judicial consideration of the extent of federal
authority over a matter.134 Also, because at least some degree of cooperation in the pursuit of shared
environmental goals is more likely to yield desired outcomes, understanding of the division of
environmental powers is required at a political as well as strictly legal level.135 The federal system and its
resulting interjurisdictional tensions have both benefits and downsides; they can help find balance
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between the desire for national unity and diverging regional needs and wants,136 but the division of
powers risks fragmentation and can result in legal vacuums over important environmental issues.137
Conflict between the two orders of government has been especially pronounced with respect to natural
resources and the competing need for environmental protection,138 with EA especially vulnerable to
jurisdictional tensions due to its application early on in decision-making and its goal of obtaining and
assessing a comprehensive suite of relevant information, much of which may be viewed by one order of
government as being outside of the reach of the other.139
Canadian courts, when addressing questions of constitutional authority, will be live to these
tensions,140 and often disappointing legislative measures (or lack of measures at all) in response to
pressing environmental issues141 suggest that the federal government is, too. Academics have noted
three reasons for a historically weak federal role in environmental regulation over time: constitutional
constraint, provincial resistance, and external pressure.142 The federal government has tended to avoid
asserting itself unilaterally over environmental matters due to concerns over conflicts with provincial
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authorities, resulting in weaker federal leadership in environmental policy-making,143 likely in large part
due to the fact that many provinces’ economies depend largely on one or two resource industries.144
Even after a favourable ruling in the Crown Zellerbach decision (discussed below), the federal
government was “reluctant to press for greater control over environmental policy-making due to
provincial resistance.”145 While the federal government has asserted its authority in matters with extraprovincial or international implications, it has predominantly preferred to follow a collaborative
approach when addressing environmental matters in order to avoid provoking the resource-dependent
provinces.146 A desire for voter support and international pressures are additional considerations facing
the federal government when deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction over the environment, often
outweighing what are seen as “diffuse benefits.”147 Indeed, the federal government only began asserting
power over environmental policy after the mid-1980s, at least partially in response to rising pressures
from international coalitions and domestic environmental groups.148 Thus, the political constitution
must also be read as including the “cultural, social and economic realities of the society for which [the
sections 91 and 92 heads of power] were intended,” as those realities will inevitably inform the policy
direction of both orders of government along with federal-provincial political realities. 149 Along with the
need to balance national standards with provincial autonomy and regional diversity, these realities are
likely to influence judicial consideration of balance of power questions.150
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3.

Next Generation EA: The Jurisdictional Questions

As seen above, sections 91 and 92 of The Constitution Act, 1867 enumerate and assign classes of
subjects to the federal Parliament and provinces, respectively. A process for informing decisionmaking,151 EA has potential to tread beyond federal heads of power and affect provincial matters. As this
section discusses, overlap with or impacts on provincial jurisdiction may occur when deciding what
projects must undergo an EA, the scope of information to consider in an assessment, and through
decision-making. This section therefore examines those aspects of next generation EA with potential for
encroachment upon provincial matters. To identify which aspects of next generation EA raise
jurisdictional issues, each of the 11 were identified for whether they involve decisions respecting which
undertakings may be subject to assessment, the scope of information considered, or decision-making.
For the reasons discussed in the remainder of this section, those aspects are the sustainability scope,
consideration of alternatives, application of assessments to all undertakings at the project, regional and
strategic levels, and cumulative effects.152 Other aspects, such as multijurisdictional collaboration and
designing appropriate assessment streams, which are focused on process and so do not directly risk
infringement on provincial authority (but do have potential to ameliorate infringement on provincial
jurisdiction), are factored into the analysis of federal jurisdiction over next generation EA in Chapter IV.

a) Sustainability focus
In next generation EA, assessments should consider the “full range of environmental and socioeconomic impacts,” including “social, cultural, ecological, economic and health considerations,” and
“aim to ensure net contributions to sustainability including the equitable distribution of risks, impacts
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and benefits.”153 Further, assessments lead to decisions that, in the project context, include conditions,
monitoring, reporting and enforcement of compliance.154 Sustainability is a broad term, which may be
best described as “a holistic concept in which social and environmental concerns are inherently
intertwined, regardless of which particular definition of sustainability, or sustainable development, is
adopted.”155 The Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as “development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”156 In EA, sustainability has been used to refer to both the scope of factors considered in the
assessment as including socio-economic and health effects along with biophysical environmental ones,
as well as a substantive overall sustainability objective or test for project approval.157 Accordingly,
“sustainability” for the purposes of this thesis includes overall assessment purposes, scope of
assessment, how decisions are made, and what occurs following the decision. According to Gibson, a key
characteristic of sustainability in the EA context is the recognition of links and interdependencies
between human and ecological systems.158 In other words, while sustainability is often perceived as
being comprised of “pillars” (e.g., environmental, economic, social and health), assessment must
understand the interdependencies among the pillars in addition to effects on the pillars themselves, in
order for sustainability to be achieved.159 Some definitions, such as the one applied by the Canadian
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Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME), include socio-economic and health conditions along
with biophysical ones in the definition of environmental effects.160
Sustainability has been an objective of assessment since the 1970s, when EA and other
mechanisms for public participation began to be seen as having the potential to make environmental
decision-making more sustainable, accountable and legitimate.161 Because one of EA’s goals is to provide
a comprehensive and integrated picture of potential socio-economic and environmental impacts,162 EA
should aspire to enhance social well-being while respecting ecological thresholds and biophysical
systems.163 Thus, a core purpose of next generation EA should be to “ensure net contributions to
sustainability including the equitable distribution of risks, impacts and benefits.”164 In addition to a
broad range of social, environmental, cultural, economic and health factors, EA should consider
government commitments, such as those related to biodiversity and climate change.165 While some
argue that a systems approach could better help EA integrate the interrelated and sometimes
competing aspects of sustainability,166 the next generation EA model that Sinclair et al propose uses
sustainability criteria and rules to guide decisions.167 Decision criteria help to recognize and better
understand the linkages among different pillars or aspects of sustainability, as well as to determine,
given the myriad impacts, benefits, risks and uncertainties of the project, whether it will make a net
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contribution to sustainability.168 In essence, sustainability criteria should seek “multiple, mutually
reinforcing, fairly distributed and lasting benefits” across all environmental and socio-economic factors
while preventing decision makers from viewing “sustainability as a field of tension among competing
social, economic and ecological objectives.”169 Where a criterion is not achieved or where trade-offs
occur (between or among pillars), trade-off rules provide legal bottom-lines against a project approval
that would result in prescribed unacceptable outcomes. As Northey states, at the core of the concept of
trade-offs is recognition of the fact that “what is an advantage to one aspect of environmental impact is
a disadvantage to another aspect of impact.”170 Trade-offs occur where it is not possible to achieve the
project benefits while avoiding the negative effects.171 Together, sustainability rules and criteria help
guide decisions towards maximum sustainability benefits while safeguarding against unacceptable
trade-offs where negative consequences are unavoidable, enhancing transparency and accountability in
the process.172
To date, a sustainability framework has been applied in at least five assessments in Canada.173 For
example, in 1997 the joint panel appointed to review the Voisey’s Bay Mine and Mill project located in
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northern Labrador looked at “ecosystem integrity, biodiversity and renewable resources,” as well as
“durable and equitable social and economic benefits” when assessing the project’s net long-term
sustainability.174 In the 2011 assessment report of the Lower Churchill hydroelectric project in Labrador,
the panel identified six overarching criteria to guide the assessment: ecological impacts, benefits, risks
and uncertainties; economic impacts, benefits, risks and uncertainties; social and cultural impacts,
benefits, risks and uncertainties; the fair distribution of effects, risks and uncertainties; present versus
future generations; and integration (i.e., do the sustainability principles work together to seek mutuallyreinforcing gains).175 More detailed criteria helped guide the determination respecting the overarching
criteria, and four additional principles were established to guide the panel’s consideration of the positive
and negative effects: maximize net gains; avoid significant adverse effects; apply fairness; and provide
explicit and transparent justification of any compromises.176
A sustainability approach raises three jurisdictional questions: first, do federal authorities have
authority to consider the full spectrum of impacts, benefits, risks and undertakings – including provincial
matters – when assessing an undertaking? Second, do decision-makers have the constitutional authority
to reject provincially regulated projects, or (in the case of regional and strategic assessment) direct the
pace and scale of development of a particular kind or in a particular region? Third, are decision-makers
authorized to issue conditions on undertakings that may be provincially regulated or conditions
respecting impacts on provincial matters, monitor those undertakings for compliance, and enforce the
conditions?
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b) Consideration of alternatives
Closely linked with a sustainability approach, assessment of alternatives “is at the heart of good
environmental planning.”177 A key objective of next generation EA is therefore the “comparative
evaluation of alternatives including the null alternative,” and selection of the preferred alternative;178
for example, where a project may cause adverse environmental effects, an assessment should “ensure
that the location or design of the project avoide[s] or minimize[s] those effects by avoiding sensitive
features or minimizing the impacts upon such features.”179 Consideration of alternatives is not unique to
EA – it is also done under expropriation law and under the Species at Risk Act,180 as well as in such dayto-day activities as selecting groceries181 – but under EA, alternatives assessment has attracted much
attention and criticism.182 From a jurisdictional perspective, a fundamental question at the heart of
alternatives assessment is the scope of potential alternatives that may be considered in an assessment
and federal authority to prefer an alternative to the proposed undertaking.
Northey identifies five stages to a rigorous review of alternatives: 1) identification of reasonable
alternatives; 2) evaluation of alternatives; 3) identification of all trade-offs; 4) application of steps and
criteria to transparently evaluate alternatives; and 5) identification of a preferred alternative.183 At the
project level, alternatives analysis falls on a spectrum from alternatives to the project, such as not
proceeding with the project or finding alternate means of meeting the proposed needs, to alternative
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means of carrying it out, such as identification of alternative routes, sites, waste management
strategies, project designs, technologies, construction scheduling, and resource management
strategies.184 Determination of what “reasonable alternatives” should be on the table should include all
reasonable potential alternatives and alternative means of carrying out the project.185 In the Whites
Point Quarry EA the Panel asked the proponent to identify alternatives to the proposed project that
were “functionally different ways to achieve the project need and purpose,” including the “no project”
scenario.186 Alternatives to the quarry included recycling used materials and purchasing aggregate from
the market.187 In the Kemess North joint review, the alternatives assessment focused primarily on
different options for disposing of waste rock and tailings.188 For the Lower Churchill Hydroelectric
Generation Project – a public utility proposal – the proposed alternatives included aggressive demandside management, alternative energy sources, adding capacity at existing generation facilities, and the
“no project” option.189 At the regional level, assessments should identify, evaluate and compare
alternative development scenarios with the aim of selecting the scenario that best meets identified
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objectives,190 while SA should examine different approaches to policy, plan or programmatic
undertakings, such as alternative endangered species recovery strategies.191
While each of the projects described above may impact areas of federal authority such as
fisheries, each also falls under provincial jurisdiction.192 Consequently, in a federal-only assessment the
question is the scope of federal authority to consider those alternative means and alternatives to and
select preferred alternatives, including the no-project scenario. In the case of Lower Churchill, the
question may be even more pronounced given that the proponent is a provincial utility. In other words,
where a project is provincially-regulated, does Parliament have authority to allow decision-makers to
require the alteration of project siting or design, reject projects outright, or approve only entirely
different means of achieving identified objectives? When does protection of a federal matter (such as
fisheries) cross the line into the development and management of non-renewable resources or
generation of electrical energy?193 At the regional level, a key question is the extent to which federal
authorities may examine and make decisions respecting alternative development scenarios that include
provincially-regulated undertakings, such as forestry and non-renewable resources. Similarly,
assessment of alternative strategic undertakings such as policies, plans, programs or issues may raise
questions respecting the extent to which federal authorities can consider, rely on or potentially even
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influence provincial undertakings. For example, Noble et al argue that the federal Strategic Assessment
of Climate Change194 ought to have considered (among other things), alternatives and scenario
assessment of “delineated pathways (e.g. for activities in specified climate-significant sectors)” and
identified such matters as “what categories of projects should be subject to assessment on climate
grounds.”195
Tilleman argues that the identification and assessment of alternatives requires decision makers to
“take a “hard look” at all reasonable means of avoiding or minimizing significant adverse environmental
effects before making their decisions”196 [emphasis in original]. According to Duinker and Greig, EA
requires a consideration of alternative possible, probable and preferable futures,197 which entails a
“comparative evaluation of the reasonable alternatives in light of their openly assessed socio-economic
and biophysical effects and risks, and attention to the broader context including cumulative effects of
other activities, existing and anticipated.”198 Before assessment of alternatives can begin, the
assessment should define the purpose of and need for the project from a public interest perspective, in
order to select the option that achieves that public interest purpose and need while also meeting the
sustainability criteria.199 Choosing among alternatives should seek to identify the “best options for
progress towards a durable and desirable future”200 according to the sustainability criteria discussed
above, with alternatives being subjected to a “contribution to sustainability test.”201 Where such futures
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involve the future of provincially-regulated undertakings or development pathways, or the future socioeconomic and health conditions in a province, there will exist a jurisdictional tension that this thesis
seeks to provide clarity on in Chapter IV.

c) Integrated, tiered assessments of all undertakings with sustainability implications
The third substantive component of Sinclair et al.’s next generation EA model is integrated, tiered
assessments, wherein all undertakings that may affect sustainability, whether they occur at the project,
strategic or regional levels, undergo assessment and are informed by assessments at the other levels.202
From a jurisdictional perspective, at issue is federal authority to trigger project, regional or strategic
assessments based on their implications for sustainability. For example, does the federal government
have authority to assess projects with no predicted impacts on areas of federal jurisdiction? What
degree of proof of federal effects is required to trigger an assessment? And as next generation EA
suggests that legislation set out mandatory triggers for RA and SA,203 the jurisdictional analysis must look
at how such triggers can prescribe for RA and SA where warranted while respecting the constitutional
division of powers. For example, is it constitutionally valid for federal authorities to trigger regional
assessments based on cumulative effects on matters exclusively or predominantly within provincial
jurisdiction? At the strategic level, to what degree must a policy, plan, program or issue pertain to
federal matters to validly trigger an assessment?
SA and RA are both important tools for providing direction for broader project-level decisionmaking.204 Indeed, the CCME considers effective cumulative effects assessment at the regional level a
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“prerequisite” to regional sustainability.205 Many conceptualizations of RA and SA exist:206 Sinclair et al.
define SA as either the assessment of new or existing policies, plans and programs, or “proactive” SAs
that occur in order to fill policy gaps.207 Sinclair, Doelle and Duinker distinguish between SA and RA in
that SA focuses on a collection of project and activity types, or on policies, programs and plans, whereas
RA is a comprehensive and integrated assessment of multiple or all human activities at a regional
scale.208 The Impact Assessment Agency of Canada defines RA broadly as “studies conducted in areas of
existing projects or anticipated development to inform planning and management of cumulative effects
and inform project impact assessments,”209 while Duinker and Greig argue that regional-scale
assessment is “an exercise in futuring” that requires scenario analysis to imagine (and identify preferred)
development futures.210 Others use the term regional-strategic EA (R-SEA) to describe regional
cumulative effects assessments that are strategic in nature.211 What numerous definitions of SA and RA
do have in common is that at the regional scale, they should each be a strategic exercise that proactively
addresses sources of cumulative effects by focusing on environmental or sustainability objectives,
interactive effects and alternative development pathways, and result in the selection of preferred
development scenarios to meet identified objectives.212 Thus, as described in the section above on
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alternatives, the questions are what alternatives can be on the table and what alternatives may a
federal authority choose over the proposed alternative?
Because of their futures-oriented approach that seeks to inform development pathways, RAs
and SAs should be “effectively tiered with project-level IA so that each tier informs and guides the
others.”213 In other words, they must inform project-level decision-making, and project IA should inform
RA and SA. A “multi-faceted and multi-dimensional assessment process” intended to inform policy and
planning processes, SA and RA can also help shape the development and implementation of strategic
initiatives and political decision-making.214 When done well, they can improve EA efficiency and
effectiveness, identify important policy objectives, generate public support for project types, identify
key issues and impacts and ways to address or minimize them, and provide guidance for project
decisions.215 They can also help address issues that are repeatedly raised in project EAs of projects of a
similar type or with a similar impact, which in turn helps ensure broader support for projects that are
identified as achieving desired outcomes216 while also identifying “no go” zones or undesired project
impacts and types. As a result, this thesis will examine the degree to which a validly-triggered regional or
strategic assessment may result in binding conditions at the project level or bar development of certain
types or in certain areas.
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d) Cumulative effects
Closely related to RA, SA and a sustainability approach is the consideration of cumulative and interactive
biophysical and socio-economic effects.217 The Cumulative Effects Assessment Working Group defined
cumulative effects as “changes to the environment that are caused by an action in combination with
other past, present and future human actions,”218 while Harriman and Noble describe them as “effects
of an additive, interactive, synergistic, or irregular (surprise) nature, caused by individually minor, but
collectively significant actions that accumulate over time and space.”219 While assessment of cumulative
effects has been a requirement of federal EA since the introduction of CEAA,220 and continues to be
required under the IAA,221 critics argue that project-level EA has consistently failed to properly account
for and address cumulative effects.222 Much blame for the failure of cumulative effects assessment to
function as desired lies in the lack of regional and strategic approaches to addressing cumulative effects
and the pace and scale of development.223 Nonetheless, a fundamental goal of next generation EA is to
ensure that all undertakings that may contribute to cumulative effects are assessed, and that projectlevel EAs emphasize the focus on cumulative effects.224
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Indeed, some suggest that all effects identified in EAs should be assumed to be cumulative, unless
the assessment demonstrates otherwise.225 The objective of cumulative effects assessment is critical,
and is linked to its scope. In next generation EA, the aim of cumulative effects assessment should be the
sustainability of valued components, including by looking at how components are affected by two or
more factors or stressors.226 Further, Robert Gibson argues that next generation EA should require
projects to demonstrate that any trade-offs will deliver “mutually reinforcing, cumulative and lasting
contributions” to environmental and socio-economic conditions.227 Central to a sustainability approach
to cumulative effects assessment is placing valued components (VCs) – those components of the
environment or socio-economic conditions considered in an assessment – at “centre stage,” examining
all projects, activities and other stressors on those components, and keeping cumulative effects within
defined “tolerable and acceptable levels.”228 Only focusing on interactions between a project and a VC is
“largely incapable of securing VEC sustainability.”229 Thus, cumulative effects assessment requires
assessment of the effects of past, existing and reasonably foreseeable future actions or stressors that
may contribute to cumulative effects on the valued component.230 For example, in Alberta Wilderness
Assn. v Cardinal River Coals Ltd.,231 (Alberta Wilderness Assn), the trial judge held that the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans had a duty to obtain all information about likely forestry and mining in the area,
and consider those effects in its cumulative effects assessment of a coal mine under CEAA.232
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Reasonably foreseeable actions include projects and activities induced by the proposed development:233
e.g., a road into a mineral-rich but undeveloped region with numerous water bodies may induce mining
and forestry projects, as well as increased hunting, fishing and trapping. To avoid gaps, the scope of the
assessment should include indirect effects from upstream and, where possible, downstream activities,
such as downstream discharges and waste generation or, in the case of pipeline projects, upstream
fossil fuel extraction and downstream combustion.234 Regionally, the assessment should include local,
regional and global effects of anticipated, existing and future stressors,235 which can be natural (such as
weather) or human-caused (such as natural resource development).236
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(described above), scenarios might include the future without the project and the future with the
project.239 As also discussed above, cumulative effects assessment is greatly assisted by the
identification of preferred visions of the future, such as through carbon budgeting in the case of climate
change, in order to contextualize a project’s contributions to cumulative effects and ensure that no
project pushes a valued component beyond a threshold or tipping point.240 Finally, while a decisionmaker may only have authority to deny or impose conditions on the project at hand in a project-level EA
(as opposed to other human-generated stressors), being able to reject that project or impose conditions
that may dramatically alter its design, location, pace or scale is key.241 From the above, the jurisdictional
questions arising in an effective cumulative effects assessment are clear: what is the extent of federal
authority to consider the broader impacts of human activities on a project, even when those impacts
may not contribute significant individual effects to an area within federal authority? What is the extent
of a federal decision-maker’s authority to say “no” or require the dramatic alteration to a project largely
regulated by a province (such as a mine) due to cumulative effects? What is the scope of federal
authority to consider the upstream and downstream impacts of a project, even where those impacts
may occur outside of federal jurisdiction (such as the burning of fossil fuels in the consuming country)?
And, as cumulative effects assessment includes follow-up,242 what is the extent of federal authority to
monitor and, where necessary, require adaptive measures where cumulative effects are found to be
unacceptable? Section IV of this thesis attempts to answer those questions, along with the others raised
by the next generation EA model.
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e) Cooperative assessment
Next generation EA requires assessment authorities to cooperate with all other jurisdictions throughout
each stage of the assessment.243 Multijurisdictional cooperation should begin as early as possible so that
authorities collaborate in designing and implementing EA processes244 that foster collaborative decisionmaking.245 Cooperation streamlines costs and other burdens caused by duplicative federal-provincial
(and Indigenous) processes, enhances certainty and efficiency, advances sustainability and enables
collective decision-making.246 Mechanisms for cooperation that have appeared in federal EA legislation
include harmonization, substitution, equivalency, delegation and standardization.247 Fitzpatrick and
Sinclair describe substitution, equivalency and, at least in some cases delegation, as retrenchment, as
they have been applied in Canada as a means of reducing the federal role in EA rather than fostering
collaboration and consequently have resulted in weaker assessments.248 Next generation EA requires
assessment authorities to collaborate with other jurisdictions at all tiers, through “upward
harmonization of assessment processes and requirements,” in an effort to reach consensus on process
and final decisions.249 While the federal government has broad jurisdiction to assess environmental and
socio-economic factors, cooperating with provincial authorities ensures that wherever an undertaking
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may impact on an area of federal authority, an assessment is able to examine the full range of issues and
address all impacts and benefits through coordinated decision-making.250
Next generation EA’s emphasis on multijurisdictional cooperation is relevant to jurisdiction
because it is through cooperation that the federal and provincial governments may achieve one of the
“fundamental objectives” of cooperative federalism described by Justices Binnie and LeBel in Canadian
Western Bank (discussed in Chapter III).251 EA can act as a table for federal and provincial cooperation in
environmental decision-making, as it facilitates intergovernmental dialogue that can result in agreement
on whether the project should be approved, which alternative should proceed, and other decisions such
as project design, location, mitigation measures, adaptive management and other conditions of
approval. In other words, next generation EA is a platform by which the two orders of government can
achieve intergovernmental dialogue aimed at fostering cooperative federalism.252 As a result, it will
feature throughout the analysis of federal jurisdiction over next generation EA in Chapter IV.

f) EA stages: triggering, information-gathering and analysis, and decision-making
As noted in section 1 of this chapter, this thesis examines federal jurisdiction over three stages of nextgeneration EA: triggering, information-gathering and analysis, and decision-making (including follow-up).
Each of those stages raises unique constitutional questions not yet fully settled in the case law. While
those questions are explored more fully in Chapter IV, this section sets out the key issues as context for
the division of powers discussion in Chapter III.
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Triggering

A fundamental goal of next generation EA is to ensure that assessments are carried out for all project
and strategic undertakings with the potential for significant effects on sustainability, or the potential to
contribute to cumulative effects.253 Thus the key jurisdictional questions with respect to triggering are
what, if any, federal constitutional “hook” or threshold is needed to trigger an assessment, and how
much certainty does a federal authority require in order to trigger an assessment? As noted above, the
EARPGO – which the Supreme Court of Canada upheld in Oldman – grounded the requirement for a
federal assessment in a federal decision or action. The EARPGO required EAs for any “initiative,
undertaking or activity for which the Government of Canada has a decision-making responsibility” and
that “may have an environmental effect on an area of federal responsibility.”254 It also required
assessments of undertakings with a federal proponent255 that would receive federal financial
assistance,256 or were located on federal lands.257 Of course, it is important not to conflate constitutional
authority to trigger an assessment with an exercise of statutory authority. A federal statutory trigger
(such as a Fisheries Act authorization) may itself be ultra vires the federal Parliament; conversely, there
may be impacts or activities within federal jurisdiction not covered by statute. As Nature Canada argues:
It is s. 91 of The Constitution Act, 1867, not statutes enacted under s. 91 heads, that confers
jurisdiction on Parliament. Further, a regulatory scheme pursuant to a federal statute may not
fully occupy the field of federal environmental jurisdiction. Failure to have enacted the Fisheries
Act would not have nullified the federal fisheries power, and Parliament would still have
authority to assess projects based on potential impacts on fish.258
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However, a federal regulatory trigger does provide greater confidence in the link to federal jurisdiction,
and at the very least demonstrates an intention of the legislators to limit the application of assessment
to areas of federal constitutional authority. Thus, this thesis seeks to answer whether a next generation
federal EA law would require an approach similar to that used in the EARPGO to be constitutionally
valid, or would it be within federal power to cast a wider net in order to uphold the goal of assessing all
projects with implications on sustainability (or the somewhat more limited objective, such as
assessment of all projects with implications on the sustainability of subject matters assigned to
Parliament under The Constitution Act, 1867). Additionally, if a next generation EA law could trigger
assessments based on their effects, what, if any, proof of impacts on federal matters would be required
at the triggering stage? For regional assessments, the key question is the extent of federal authority to
trigger an assessment in a region comprised primarily or entirely of provincial Crown lands, and the
scope of issues within regions that could justify triggering a regional assessment: for example, would the
federal government’s decision to trigger an RA in Ontario’s Ring of Fire be constitutionally valid if the
sole reason for triggering the assessment is concerns respecting future mining activities? If so, what
potential impacts, if any, on areas of federal jurisdiction could a federal authority rely on to ensure that
the assessment trigger is a valid exercise of federal authority? For strategic assessment, the question
relates to the breadth of policies, plans, programs and issues the federal government could assess. For
example, does the federal government have constitutional authority to trigger the SATCM, given
provincial authority over non-renewable natural resources?
Information-gathering and analysis

The questions respecting federal jurisdiction regarding the scope of information a federal authority may
require and assess are closely related to the questions identified in the other sections above: namely,
once an assessment is validly triggered, does the federal Parliament have jurisdiction to assess the full
50

scope of environmental, socio-economic and health impacts and cumulative effects? For project
assessment, in addition to the scope of effects is the question of scope of project and activities a federal
authority may consider. 259 For example, does Parliament have authority to consider the impacts of
upstream petroleum exploration, extraction and production required to produce the oil that will flow
through a pipeline that is the subject of the assessment? What about the downstream climate
implications of burning that oil? What if the oil is consumed in another country? If so, can it also
consider the health effects arising from that downstream consumption, such as health effects caused by
increased air pollution from the oil consumption in another country? For regional assessment, can the
federal government consider the full range of undertakings within a region, such as the impacts of
provincial land and resource-use planning, and socio-economic considerations respecting mineral
development in a region such as the Ring of Fire? As with project assessment, are there upstream and
downstream limits to the information that a federal authority can consider? And for strategic
assessment, is there any limit to the information that federal authorities may consider when assessing
strategic undertakings like federal policies, plans or programs, or policy direction respecting an activity
like thermal coal mining?
Decision-making

The decision stage is likely the phase requiring most attention to federal jurisdiction. At the project level,
decision-making entails determining whether a project should or should not proceed,260 although in next
generation EA the focus moves beyond the project/no project binary and emphasizes the application of
sustainability-based criteria and trade off rules to identify the preferred alternative.261 Thus two key
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questions for project assessment are the extent to which there must be impacts on areas of federal
jurisdiction for a federal authority may apply criteria and trade-off rules and select the preferred
alternative, and the extent to which the criteria and rules may pertain to provincial matters. For
example, Kennett raises the hypothetical situation of a hydroelectric dam that will impact cottonwood
trees:262 what degree of impacts, if any, on areas of federal jurisdiction (such as navigation and shipping
or fisheries) would be required to uphold a federal decision to refuse the project? Where the dam would
have moderate impacts on navigation, could the federal government also rely on the impacts to the
cottonwood trees as a basis for refusing the dam? What about where the dam would have significant
impacts on navigation and cottonwood trees, but the provincial authority has determined that the dam
is its preferred option for meeting energy demand and reducing provincial greenhouse gas emissions?
Could the federal government apply criteria and rules respecting health, socio-economic and provincial
environmental factors to select a different option, such as geothermal, that the province has rejected on
another basis (for example, cost)? What happens in the case of an impasse? Finally, after the
assessment, what is the extent of federal authority to impose conditions of approval on projects and
impose follow-up and monitoring programs, for example, in relation to provincial impacts?
For regional and strategic assessment, the constitutional questions relate to the extent to which
federal Parliament has authority to direct planning or other provincial matters at the regional or
strategic levels. For example, since (as noted above) SA and RA are strategic exercises that should result
in the selection of preferred development scenarios to meet identified objectives, 263 what jurisdictional
limits are there on federal power to direct natural resource development in a region? For example,
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could the Ring of Fire RA result in direction respecting the pace and scale of mining in the region and if
so, what are the jurisdictional limitations to that direction? For a strategic assessment like the SATCM, to
what degree can a federal authority issue policy direction respecting thermal coal mining, such as its
pace, scale, and end uses? Is there any limit to the information federal authorities may consider when
developing policies, plans or programs? Before seeking to answer these questions in Chapter IV, this
thesis describes the key applicable constitutional doctrines and principles to help guide the analysis.
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III.

The Division of Powers: Analyses, Doctrines and Cooperative
Federalism

As noted above, the ‘fathers of confederation’ divided legislative power between the federal and
provincial legislatures through sections 91 and 92 of the BNA Act by assigning specific matters among
sections 91 and 92 to one of the orders of government and, for matters not specifically listed, allocating
to the provinces matters of a merely local or private nature and to the federal Parliament matters
concerning POGG and those not specifically allocated to the provinces.264 Due to the broad, diffuse
nature of the environment, it is possible to relate certain aspects of it to “either a federal or a provincial
head of legislative power.”265 In this way, the federal and provincial heads of power are in
competition,266 as laws may be rationally classified in more than one way and legislative overlap is
inevitable.267
A court may strike down a law as being ultra vires the enacting legislature if it is beyond that
government’s constitutional authority.268 It does so by first identifying the “essence of the regulated
subject matter,” or its “pith and substance,” and then identifying under which head of power the subject
matter falls.269 Challenged laws are classified by their leading features,270 and legislation will be found to
be intra vires if its essential character is related to a head of power that has been assigned in the
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Constitution to the enacting order of government.271 A measure that encroaches on the jurisdiction of
the other order of government may still be found to be intra vires under doctrines such as the ancillary
powers or double aspect doctrines, or it may be found to be inoperable under the paramountcy
doctrine, or inapplicable under the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine (both discussed below).272
This chapter seeks to establish the constitutional foundation of next generation EA by exploring
how a reviewing court may define its pith and substance, and under what head or heads of power a
court may assign its subject matter. It begins by investigating the division of powers case law, as well as
the relevant constitutional doctrines articulated by the courts. It next applies the case law to the next
generation EA framework in an effort to identify whether and how next generation EA could be upheld
as intra vires the federal Parliament. Finally, it discusses the principle of cooperative federalism and how
emphasizing cooperation with other jurisdictions could help shield a next generation federal assessment
law from judicial interference.

1.

Steps in a Division of Powers Analysis

The two steps in a division of powers case are first to identify the matter, or pith and substance, of the
challenged law, and second to assign the matter to a class of subjects in order to identify the relevant
head of power.273 Each step is discussed below.
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a) Characterizing the subject matter of the legislation
Where the validity of a legislative measure is challenged on the basis of the division of powers, the first
step is to analyse the “pith and substance” of the legislation.274 Determining the law’s pith and
substance entails characterizing it in order to identify its essential character or “true nature” or
“dominant characteristic” in order to identify the matter it relates to.275 In Whitbread v Walley, the
Court described the term “pith and substance” as:
… [the] constitutional value represented by the challenged legislation”, as “an abstract of the
statute's content", and as "the true meaning of the challenged legislation" or the "leading
feature" or "true nature and character" of the impugned law... Whatever the phrase used, the
idea remains the same: division of powers analysis commences with an identification of "the
dominant or most important characteristic of the challenged law.276
The objective of this step is to identify the subject matter of the law in order to assign that law to a
matter over which the enacting legislature has authority.277 If a law’s pith and substance is found to
relate to a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature it will be intra vires, and if it
is found to relate to a matter outside that legislature, it will be held invalid.278 The need to identify the
matter of a law is derived from the language of sections 91 and 92 of The Constitution Act, which give
legislative authority in relation to “matters” coming within “classes of subjects.”279 Hogg states that “the
sole purpose of identifying the “matter” of a law is to determine whether the law is constitutional or
not,” and therefore in identifying the subject matter, the courts will often “use concepts that will assist
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in determining to which head of power the “matter” should be alloccted [sic],” such as finding that a
matter is related to insurance (which falls under provincial authority) or banking (federal).280 By
identifying the matter of a statute, courts “will often effectively settle the question of its validity, leaving
the allocation of the matter to a class of subject little more than a formality.”281
A pith and substance analysis is “essentially a matter of interpretation” rather than a formalistic
undertaking.282 Courts will look to the legislative scheme, relevant extrinsic material and judicial
decisions on similar kinds of statues, but the “choice is inevitably one of policy” that Hogg argues will be
guided by federalism principles.283 Indeed, in Canadian Western Bank, the majority acknowledged that a
fundamental rule of constitutional interpretation is that "[w]hen a federal statute can be properly
interpreted so as not to interfere with a provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be applied in
preference to another applicable construction which would bring about a conflict between the two
statutes."284 In determining the pith and substance of a law, the court will look to both its purpose and
effect to determine its “main thrust.”285 The purpose of the law must be its true purpose and not just a
stated or apparent purpose, and to determine a law’s purpose, a court may look to intrinsic evidence
such as preambles and purpose provisions, as well as extrinsic evidence, such as Hansard, reports of
royal commissions, law reform commissions and government policy papers.286 The purpose may be
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ascertained by identifying the “mischief,” or problems the law is intended to address.287 The law’s
effects include both its legal and practical consequences,288 and may also reveal its true purpose,
although secondary, or incidental, effects or objectives do not impact a law’s constitutionality if its pith
and substance falls within the legislating jurisdiction’s authority.289 A court may also find that a law is a
colourable attempt to legislate in respect of a matter within the other order of government’s
authority.290 The colourability doctrine “applies the maxim that a legislative body cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly.”291 In the Firearms Reference, the Supreme Court held that a law may be
“colourable if its stated purposes diverge substantially from its actual effects.”292
In Ward v Canada,293 at issue was whether provisions of the federal Fisheries Act prohibiting the
sale, trade or barter of young hooded and harp seals fell under the federal fisheries or criminal powers
and were therefore valid, or under the provincial power over property and civil rights.294 The Supreme
Court of Canada held that a law’s purpose refers to “what the legislature wanted to accomplish” and in
this case “is relevant to determine whether… Parliament was regulating the fishery, or venturing into
the provincial area of property and civil rights.”295 The legal effect of the law “refers to how the law will
affect rights and liabilities, and is also helpful in illuminating the core meaning of the law” as well as
whether it is colourable.296 Courts may also look to the practical effect of the law, or what side effects
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may result from the application of the statute,297 but the analysis does not ask about the law’s efficacy in
achieving the legislature’s goals.298
Looking at the regulatory scheme as a whole, as well as the legislative history, the Court found
that the purpose of the impugned provision was to control the killing of the seals by prohibiting their
sale, not to control commerce.299 It held that “[t]he question is not whether the Regulations prohibit the
sale so much as why it is prohibited.”300 The Court noted the difficulty in identifying the particular
species of seals during a hunt, and therefore that prohibiting the harvesting of the seals “simply would
not have worked,” and while the method chosen – to prohibit their sale in order to discourage their
harvest – may not have been perfect, “the efficacy of the law is not a valid consideration in the pith and
substance analysis.”301 The Court held that the intention of the federal Parliament was to “regulate the
seal fishery by eliminating the commercial hunting of whitecoats and bluebacks through a prohibition on
sale… Stated another way, the “mischief’ that Parliament sought to remedy was the large-scale
commercial hunting of whitecoats and bluebacks.”302 Regarding the effects of the impugned provision,
the Court acknowledged that it “affects the legal rights of its subjects by prohibiting the sale of
whitecoats and bluebacks that have otherwise been legally harvested,” but dismissed the defendant’s
argument that the legal effect is to regulate property, holding that the argument “amounts to saying
that because the legislative measure is a prohibition on sale, it must be in pith and substance concerned
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with the regulation of sale.”303 Accordingly, the Court held that the prohibition was a valid exercise of
the federal Parliament’s authority under the fisheries power.304

b) Assigning the matter to a head of power
The second stage in a division of powers analysis is to assign the matter to a “class of subjects” specified
in Constitution (i.e., a head of power).305 In other words, a court must identify what the matter is “in
relation to.”306 This step is also known as the classification stage, or “whether the legislation so
characterized falls under the head of power said to support it.”307 Classifying the law is not a technical,
formalistic exercise confined to its strict legal operation,308 and “may require interpretation of the scope
of the power.”309 This exercise involves interpreting the Constitution’s division of powers.310 The
distribution of powers is exhaustive, meaning that “the totality of the legislative power is distributed
between the federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures,” although because the drafters could
not have foreseen all future laws and matters, new or unforeseen kinds of laws and matters are dealt
with by section 92(16) (“generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province”) and
the POGG power, a residual power granted to Parliament under section 91.311 As a result, “any matter

303

Ibid at para 25.

304

Ibid at para 2.

305

Bell Canada v Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec), [1988] 1 SCR 749, [1988] SCJ No 41 at
para 185 [Bell Canada]; Ward, ibid at para 29; Firearms Reference, supra note 274 at para 25; Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra
note 12 at 15.3.8.
306

Firearms Reference, ibid.

307

Securities Act Reference, supra note 285 at para 65.

308

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 15.14

309

Securities Act Reference, supra note 285 at para 65.

310

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 15.38.8.

311

Ibid at 15.46.

60

which does not come within any of the specific classes of subjects will be provincial if it is merely local or
private… and will be federal if it has a national dimension.”312
In Ward, McLachlin C.J. summarized the principles that guide the exercise of assigning the matter
to a class of subjects as follows: First, “[t]he Constitution must be interpreted flexibly over time to meet
new social, political and historic realities.”313 Second, “[t]he principle of federalism must be respected,”
meaning that “[c]lasses of subjects should be construed in relation to each other,” and in the case of
overlap, “meaning may be given to both through the process of "mutual modification.”314 Finally, care
must be taken not to construe classes of subjects so broadly “as to expand jurisdiction indefinitely.”315
She summarized these principles as “flexibility and respect for the proper powers of both the federal
government and the provinces.”316 Canvassing the case law on the extent of the fisheries power,
MacLachlin C.J. concluded that there is no doubt that “the fisheries power includes not only
conservation and protection, but also the general “regulation” of the fisheries, including their
management and control.”317 Under the Constitution, fisheries “refers to fisheries as a resource” that
includes both the animals themselves and the related “commercial and economic interests, aboriginal
rights and interest, and public interest in sport and recreation.”318 However, the fisheries power is not
unlimited and must be construed to respect the provincial power over property and civil rights.319
Where there exist broad provincial and federal powers, “bright jurisdictional lines are elusive,” and
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determining which class of subjects an activity falls under “can only be determined by examining the
activity at stake.”320 If the measures are in pith and substance related to the maintenance and
preservation of fisheries, they fall under federal power, whereas if the measures are in pith and
substance related to trade and industry within the province they will be outside the federal power.321
The Chief Justice held:
While Parliament must respect the provincial power over property and civil rights, the approach
to be adopted is not simply drawing a line between federal and provincial powers on the basis of
conservation or sale. The issue is rather whether the matter regulated is essentially connected -related in pith and substance -- to the federal fisheries power, or to the provincial power over
property and civil rights.322
The Court found that the provision was a valid exercise of the federal fisheries power because in pith
and substance, it is concerned with preservation of the fisheries as an economic resource.323
In the Securities Act Reference (2011), the Supreme Court of Canada referred the federalism
principle that the two orders of government are coordinate, and noted that as a result, “a federal head
of power cannot be given a scope that would eviscerate a provincial legislative competence.”324 In that
case, the Court was considering whether a proposed Canadian securities law fell under the federal
power over general trade and commerce under section 91(2). It noted that the potential for the general
trade and commerce power to be interpreted so broadly as to permit it to duplicate or even eviscerate
aspects of certain provincial powers has led courts to curtail the power in order to maintain the balance
of federalism.325 At the same time, it also noted that the power must be given a meaningful scope so as
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to not upset the balance of power against Parliament.326 The Court held that the main thrust of the law
in question was the regulation of all aspects of securities trading in Canada, a matter that it found was
primarily local in nature, and therefore fell outside the scope of the general trade and commerce power
as it had been defined in the jurisprudence.327

2.

Where Overlap Occurs

Federal legislation may affect matters within provincial authority and still be upheld as constitutional –
in fact, overlap is considered “proper and expected” under Canada’s model of federalism, so long as
conflict is avoided.328 This section describes the different tools courts have created to address issues of
overlap. Courts have dealt with concurrency through the double aspect and pith and substance
doctrines (the latter through incidental effects and ancillary powers), conflict through the paramountcy
doctrine, and adverse impacts on a core competence of the other jurisdiction through the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. 329 These doctrines are described in more detail below, following a
brief look at the presumption of constitutionality.

a) Presumption of constitutionality
The presumption of constitutionality assumes that a law is intra vires unless it is proved to be invalid.
The presumption places the onus of proving unconstitutionality on the challenging party, and requires
“[j]udicial restraint” in determining that a law is invalid.330 The presumption has been recently
summarized by the Supreme Court as holding that “Parliament intends its laws to co-exist with

326
327

Ibid at para 74.
Ibid at paras 106, 122.

328

Canadian Western Bank, supra note 130 at para 28.

329

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 15.38.9, 15.46; see also Wright, supra note 265 at 642-43.

330

Hogg, ibid at 15.23; Firearms Reference, supra note 274 at para 25.

63

provincial laws.”331 A purpose of the doctrine is to reduce the interference of unelected judges with the
elected legislative branch, a concern expressed by the Court in such cases as the Employment Insurance
Reference and OPSEU.332 According to Hogg, it carries three legal consequences: first, “in choosing
between competing, plausible characterizations of a law, the court should normally choose the one that
would support the validity of the law.333 Second, the enacting government need only demonstrate that
there is a “rational basis” for a finding of fact in support of the law (such as that an emergency exists),
not prove that fact strictly.334 And third, “where a law is open to both a narrow and a wide
interpretation, and under the wide interpretation the law’s application would extend beyond the
powers of the enacting legislative body, the court should “read down” the law so as to confine it to
those applications that are within the power of the enacting legislative body.”335 Pursuant to this
doctrine, a reviewing court would presume that a federal next generation EA law is valid, and the onus
would be on the challenging party to show that the law is invalid. Moreover, to the extent a next
generation EA law could be read as permitting Parliament to encroach on provincial authority to an
extent that would upset the balance of power, a reviewing court would interpret the law in a manner
that supports its validity while ensuring its application respects constitutional bounds.

b) Incidental effects
The pith and substance doctrine permits federal laws that in pith and substance relate to a federal head
of power to have incidental effects on a provincial head of power; similarly, provincial legislatures may
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enact laws that in pith and substance relate to provincial heads of power but that have incidental effects
on a federal head of power. As a majority of the Supreme Court in Canadian Western Bank held:
The “pith and substance” doctrine is founded on the recognition that it is in practice impossible
for a legislature to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter effectively without incidentally affecting
matters within the jurisdiction of another level of government. For example, as Brun and
Tremblay point out, it would be impossible for Parliament to make effective laws in relation to
copyright without affecting property and civil rights, or for provincial legislatures to make
effective laws in relation to civil law matters without incidentally affecting the status of foreign
nationals.336
“Incidental” is defined as including “effects that may be of significant practical importance but are
collateral and secondary to the mandate of the enacting legislature.”337 In Whitbread, La Forest J. for the
Court held that provisions of the Canada Shipping Act, RSC 1970, c S-9 (now RSC 1985, c S-9) respecting
the liability of ship owners in actions for damages will be held constitutionally valid if they are “in pith
and substance legislation in relation to a matter that comes within the jurisdiction conferred by s. 91(10)
or, alternatively… if they are found to be “necessarily incidental”, “ancillary” or “integral” to the
legislative scheme that is admittedly within s 91(10).”338 If the provisions “are found to be legislation
that is in pith and substance in relation to matters within Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over
navigation and shipping, the inquiry is at an end, for it would then be immaterial that they also affect
matters of property and civil rights.”339 The Court held that the pith and substance of the impugned
provisions is Canadian maritime law, and they therefore are intra vires Parliament,340 and that pleasure
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craft are “closely integrated” with navigation and shipping and therefore fall under the federal
authority.341
In the Firearms Reference, the question was whether Parliament has constitutional authority to
enact a gun control law requiring firearm holders to obtain licenses and register their guns under the
POGG or criminal law powers.342 In that case, Alberta argued that the law “inappropriately trenches on
provincial powers and that upholding it as criminal law will upset the balance of federalism.”343 The
Court held that if the law is mainly in relation to criminal law, “incidental effects in the provincial sphere
are constitutionally irrelevant.”344 But if the purpose and effects of the law “go so far as to establish that
it is mainly a law in relation to property and civil rights, then the law is ultra vires the federal
government,” and so the question at bar is “whether the “provincial” effects are incidental, in which
case they are constitutionally irrelevant, or whether they are so substantial that they show that the law
is mainly, or “in pith and substance” the regulation of property and civil rights.”345 The Court held that
Alberta failed to establish that any effects of the law on provincial matters were more than incidental:
the criminal law power often affects property and civil rights and sharp lines cannot be drawn between
the two powers, the impugned legislation does not significant hinder the province’s ability to regulate
firearms, and under the double aspect doctrine the provinces can still regulate the ownership of
ordinary firearms.346
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Under the “modern paradigm” approach to federalism, which is used to “accommodate
substantial overlap in federal and provincial jurisdiction,”347 problems resulting from incidental effects
may be resolved by viewing the law “in a different light so as to place it in another constitutional head of
power.”348

c) Ancillary powers doctrine/necessarily incidental
The ancillary powers doctrine applies where a provision of a validly enacted statute intrudes on the
jurisdiction of another order of government. Unlike the incidental effects rule, the ancillary powers
doctrine may save an otherwise invalid provision providing that the provision is an integral part of an
otherwise valid legislative scheme.349 As McLachlin CJ described in Quebec (AG) v Lacombe:
The ancillary powers doctrine permits one level of government to trench on the jurisdiction of
the other in order to enact a comprehensive regulatory scheme. In pith and substance,
provisions enacted pursuant to the ancillary powers doctrine fall outside the enumerated
powers of their enacting body: General Motors, at pp. 667-70. Consequently, the invocation of
ancillary powers runs contrary to the notion that Parliament and the legislatures have sole
authority to legislate within the jurisdiction allocated to them by the Constitution Act, 1867.
Because of this, the availability of ancillary powers is limited to situations in which the intrusion
on the powers of the other level of government is justified by the important role that the
extrajurisdictional provision plays in a valid legislative scheme. The relation cannot be
insubstantial: Nykorak v. Attorney General of Canada, [1962] S.C.R. 331, at p. 335; Gold Seal Ltd.
v. Attorney-General for the Province of Alberta (1921), 62 S.C.R. 424, at p. 460; Global Securities,
at para. 23.
In General Motors v City National Leasing, the Supreme Court held that “[a]s the seriousness of the
encroachment on provincial powers varies, so does the test required to ensure that an appropriate
constitutional balance is maintained.”350 In determining whether the ancillary powers doctrine may save
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an impugned provision, a court must consider how integrated into and important for the legislative
scheme the provision is, as well as the degree of encroachment into the other order of government’s
powers. Where the encroachment is marginal, the provision may only require a “rational, functional
relationship” with the legislative scheme to be justified. However, where the degree of intrusion is
great, the provision may only be saved if it is found to be “necessarily incidental” to (i.e., a necessary
component of) a valid statute.351 Thus, a provision of a next generation EA law that intrudes on
provincial jurisdiction may be upheld if it is found to be rationally connected or necessarily incidental to
the federal law.

d) Double aspect doctrine
The double aspect doctrine is a means of tolerating overlap between federal and provincial legislative
power by permitting the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures to legislate in respect of the same
matter for two different legislative purposes.352 It is used to sustain laws related to the same general
matter enacted by the federal and a provincial government under their respective heads of power (such
as criminal law federally, and property and civil rights provincially).353 The doctrine recognizes that
“some kinds of laws have both a federal and a provincial “matter” and are therefore competent to both
the Dominion and the provinces.”354 Indeed, Lederman argues that matters having double aspects is the
norm rather than the exception,355 although he then goes on to claim that much of Canadian
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constitutional law has adhered to the principle of finding “mutual exclusion if practical, but concurrency
if necessary.”356 As the Court in the Securities Act Reference wrote:
Canadian constitutional law has long recognized that the same subject or “matter” may possess
both federal and provincial aspects. This means that a federal law may govern a matter from
one perspective and a provincial law from another. The federal law pursues an objective that in
pith and substance falls within Parliament’s jurisdiction, while the provincial law pursues a
different objective that falls within provincial jurisdiction.357
In this way, the double aspect doctrine “allows for the concurrent application of both federal and
provincial legislation, but it does not create concurrent jurisdiction over a matter”358 [emphasis in
original]. The doctrine simply recognizes that where a matter has a double aspect, it will be “impossible”
to categorize it “under a single head of power”359 and the federal and provincial legislatures may govern
it from different perspectives.360 As the majority in Canadian Western Bank held, “the fact that a matter
may for one purpose and in one aspect fall within federal jurisdiction does not mean that it cannot, for
another purpose and in another aspect, fall within provincial competence.” 361 Where the federal and
provincial aspects of a matter are found to be of equivalent importance or significance, it will not be
possible to find that the matter falls exclusively to one order of government or another.362 A classic
example is drunk driving: the federal government may regulate in respect of it under the criminal law
power, while the provinces may enact drunk driving legislation under its power over local works and
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undertakings (i.e., highways) and property and civil rights (licensing). Seen thus, drunk driving cannot be
classified as an exclusively federal or provincial matter.
The double aspect doctrine is applicable when “the contrast between the relative importance of
the two features is not so sharp.”363 It demonstrates judicial restraint when finding that “the federal and
provincial characteristics of a law are roughly equal in importance” and may fall under the authority of
the federal or provincial governments.364 However, in Bell Canada the Supreme Court held that the
double aspect doctrine does not apply when both levels of government have legislated “for the same
purpose and in the same aspect.”365 Justice Beetz wrote that section 91(29) and the exceptions in
section 92(10) create exclusive classes of subject – federal undertakings – and that this power includes
the exclusive power to manage those undertakings.366 In the Firearms Reference, the Supreme Court
held that a federal gun control law, pertaining to a matter with both a criminal law and property and
civil rights aspect, had only incidental effects on provincial authority.367 In Multiple Access Ltd. v
McCutcheon, Dickson J. for the majority applied the double aspect doctrine to uphold both Ontario
securities legislation and the Canada Corporations Act, RSC 1970, c C-32 in the face of a challenge of
federally-incorporated companies charged under the Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1970, c 426. At issue
was whether provisions in the Ontario act respecting insider trading were ultra vires the province of
Ontario and inoperative under the paramountcy doctrine because they duplicated provisions of the
federal legislation. Dickson J. noted the double character of securities legislation, and that provinces
have the authority to regulate securities under the property and civil rights power.368 He held that so
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long as provincial securities legislation does not sterilize or substantially impair a federally-incorporated
company, the provincial securities power extends to those companies.369 Additionally, federal provisions
respecting insider trading “have both a securities law and a companies law aspect” of relatively equal
importance, and could be upheld under the double aspect doctrine.370 Dickson J. held that where the
federal and provincial aspects of a matter are of roughly equal importance, “there would seem little
reason, when considering validity, to kill one and let the other live.”371
Applied during a pith and substance analysis, the double aspect doctrine is used to demonstrate
judicial restraint by ensuring “the policies of the elected legislators of both levels of government are
respected.”372 For example, federal and provincial EA legislation may be identical in their purposes and
processes they set out, but the provincial law may be classified as informing provincial decision-making,
whereas the federal law would be classified as informing federal decision-making. Where the double
aspect doctrine gives rise to conflict between valid federal and valid provincial laws, the doctrine of
federal paramountcy applies.373

e) Paramountcy
The paramountcy doctrine looks at the operability of overlapping legislation, rendering provincial
legislation inoperative if it is found to conflict with federal legislation.374 Where a court finds that both
orders of government may validly legislate in respect of a matter but a federal and provincial law
conflict, the doctrine of paramountcy states that the federal law prevails and the provincial law is
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inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.375 Both laws need to be found to be otherwise valid (i.e.,
that the pith and substance of the law comes within a class of subjects assigned to the enacting
government) in order for the doctrine to be invoked. Only if both are found to be valid can a court move
on to the question of inconsistency.376 As a result, the paramountcy doctrine could not be applied to
uphold next generation EA legislation that is ultra vires Parliament; however, as it may shield a valid
federal EA law or decision that conflicts with a provincial one, it merits exploring here.
As a rationale for the doctrine, Lederman writes that the ‘fathers of confederation’ intended the
heads of power enumerated under section 91 to act as subtractions or withdrawals from the provincial
power over property and civil rights, evidenced by the “notwithstanding” clause in the opening words of
section 91 and “deeming” clause in the closing words:377 namely that Parliament has exclusive legislative
authority over the classes of subjects enumerated in section 91 “notwithstanding anything in this Act,”
and those classes of subjects “shall not be deemed” to also come within the provincial power over
matters of a local nature.378 He argues that these exemptions to the provincial general power were
necessary because “a general grant of power to the central Parliament in all matters not assigned to the
provinces would in and by itself not be enough to give the central Parliament all the powers they wished
it to have.”379 The doctrine of paramountcy operates as a safeguard for these specific powers, as well as
a practical means of determining the allocation of power in cases of conflict.
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Wright argues that while the Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine should be used with
restraint,380 “the paramountcy doctrine is clearly to occupy pride of place in a division of powers
analysis.”381 Hogg agrees with the need for restraint, stating that “[w]here it is possible to interpret
either the federal law or the provincial law so as to avoid the conflict that would trigger paramountcy,
then that interpretation should be preferred to an alternative that brings about a conflict between the
two laws.”382 In Canadian Western Bank, Binnie and LeBel JJ. for the majority reconciled this tension by
explaining that the doctrine of federal paramountcy “recognizes that where laws of the federal and
provincial levels come into conflict, there must be a rule to result the impasse,” and that “[u]nder our
system, the federal law prevails.”383 The doctrine applies where there is an express contradiction or
operational conflict between a provincial and federal law, as well as when a provincial law is
incompatible with or frustrates the purpose of a federal law.384 It may apply to laws enacted both under
provincial ancillary powers as well as primary powers, and renders the provincial legislation “inoperative
to the extent of the incompatibility, 385 and therefore not invalid. Express contradiction occurs when one
law expressly contradicts the other, such as when it is impossible for a person to comply with both laws
at once.386 In Multiple Access, Dickson J. found that there was no operational conflict between the
Ontario Securities Act and the Canada Corporations Act, as the provincial legislation simply duplicated
the federal law without conflicting it.387 He noted that “the doctrine of paramountcy applies where

380

Saskatchewan v Lemare Lake Logging, [2015] SCR 419, 2015 SCC 53 at para 27 [Saskatchewan v Lemare Lake].

381

Wright, supra note 265 at 649.

382

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 16.5.

383

Canadian Western Bank, supra note 130 at para 32.

384

Ibid at paras 69, 71-73; Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 16.4.

385

Canadian Western Bank, ibid at para 69.

386

Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 12 at 16.4.

387

Multiple Access, supra note 363 at 189-90.

73

there is a federal law and a provincial law which are (1) each valid and (2) inconsistent,”388 which it
referred to as the “express contradiction test.”389 The majority went on to find:
In principle, there would seem to be no good reasons to speak of paramountcy and preclusion
except where there is actual conflict in operation as where one enactment says "yes" and the
other says "no"; "the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things"; compliance with
one is defiance of the other.390
In that case, it was germane that the potential conflict at bar – double-recovery in the case of insider
trading – could be safeguarded against by the courts.391 As a result, the majority held that the
paramountcy doctrine did not apply and upheld the impugned Ontario provisions.392 The Supreme Court
in Spraytech also referred to the “express contradiction test” used in Multiple Access in finding that as
the federal pesticides legislation regulating the use of pesticides is permissive in nature, there was no
operational conflict between it and the bylaw in question.393 Similarly, the majority in Canadian Western
Bank held that the paramountcy doctrine was not engaged in that case, as there was no operational
conflict between the provincial and federal laws and compliance with the provincial law would not
frustrate the purposes of the federal law.394
In 2005 in Rothmans, the Supreme Court upheld provincial legislation prohibiting the advertising,
promotion and display of tobacco products in any premises in Saskatchewan where minors were
permitted. Tobacco companies challenged the legislation, arguing that it conflicted with federal
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legislation that permitted the display of tobacco products.395 The Court held that there was no
impossibility of dual compliance, as the federal Tobacco Act, SC 1997, c 13 did not give rise to a “positive
entitlement” to display tobacco products, and so it was possible to comply with both the federal and
provincial statutes by either not displaying tobacco products or not permitting minors to enter the
establishment.396 It found that the purpose of the federal legislation was “to address a national health
problem,” and the purpose of the impugned provision to be “to circumscribe the general prohibition on
promotion of tobacco products,” which the provincial legislation furthered.397 In Saskatchewan v Lemare
Lake Logging of 2015, the majority of the Supreme Court emphasized “the guiding principle of
cooperative federalism [that] paramountcy must be narrowly construed” and held that “harmonious
interpretations of federal and provincial legislation should be favoured over interpretations that result in
incompatibility.”398 There was an alleged conflict between federal bankruptcy legislation, which required
10-day period of advance notice to debtor of an application to appoint a receiver over the debtor’s
assets, and Saskatchewan legislation requiring a 150-day period of advance notice along with a
mandatory review and mediation process. The majority found that there was no express contradiction,
as the creditor could comply with both acts by complying the with longer notice period and other
requirements of provincial law.399
However, in Lafarge, issued concurrently with Canadian Western Bank, the majority of the
Supreme Court found that a City of Vancouver bylaw would create an operational conflict with federal
authority over a marine facility in the Vancouver Port. In that case, the proponent needed approval from
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the Vancouver Port Authority and the City under its land-use bylaw to develop the facility. The majority
held that “the mere requirement of municipal approval would give rise to “operational conflict” and
therefore it was not even necessary to seek the permission of the City.400 The operational conflict arose
due to the fact that the bylaw imposed a 30-foot height restriction. Even though the City could waive
the height limit up to 100 feet, doing so “would impose the condition precedent of an exercise of
discretion by the City to approve a project that has already been approved by the VPA,” which “would
create an operational conflict that would flout the federal purpose, by depriving the VPA of its final
decisional authority on the development of the port, in respect of matters which fall within the
legislative authority of Parliament.”401 The majority also found that the bylaw would frustrate the
federal purpose under the Canada Marine Act, SC 1998 c 10 to allow the port authority to have decisionmaking authority over the project.402 Wright argues that the key distinction between Lafarge and
Canadian Western Bank that likely influenced the difference in outcomes was the fact that in Lafarge,
the federal and municipal authorities had worked out an agreement regarding the proposed
development that would not require application of the bylaw, and it was a ratepayers association, not
an order of government, that brought the challenge.403 In other words, by finding the bylaw inoperative,
the majority was facilitating intergovernmental dialogue, just as it was by upholding provincial
legislation in Canadian Western Bank.
Express contradiction will also be found where it is possible to comply with both laws but the
effect of the provincial law would frustrate the purpose of the federal law.404 For the doctrine to be
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invoked, “clear proof of purpose" is required.”405 In Law Society of BC v Mangat,406 the Supreme Court
held that a BC law prohibiting non-lawyers from practicing law for remuneration (including by going
before a federal administrative tribunal) frustrated the purpose of the federal Immigration Act, RSC
1985, c I-2, which provided that a party could be represented by a non-lawyer in proceedings before the
Immigration and Refugee Board. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a party could comply with both
laws by obeying the stricter provincial law, but to do so would frustrate the purpose of the federal law
of allowing informal, affordable, speedier and more accessible processes.407
Hogg argues that there should not be an impossibility of dual compliance where both a federal
and provincial law require the consent of their respective authorities for a project, as “[b]oth levels of
government may give their consent, which would obviate any conflict.”408 It is only where one level of
government denies consent and the other grants consent that there is an impossibility of dual
compliance, which would cause the federal decision to prevail over the provincial decision.409 Where
one level of government imposes more stringent conditions of approval, there will be no conflict as the
proponent can simply comply with the stricter conditions.410 In other words, according to Hogg a federal
authority may approve or reject a project based on the outcomes of a next generation EA, and so long as
a provincial authority issues the same decision, there will be no conflict. If a provincial authority reaches
a different decision, the federal decision will prevail (although see Chapter IV for a discussion of the
necessary constitutional basis for federal decisions), and in the case of approval with conditions, there
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should be no conflict providing there is no contradiction among the conditions and the proponent
adheres to the higher standards.
The burden of proving that a provincial law frustrates the purpose of a federal law is high, as clear
proof is required.411 As seen in the discussion on the double aspect doctrine duplication is not a trigger
of paramountcy,412 and a provincial law may supplement the requirements of a federal law.413 As the
majority found in Canadian Western Bank, “[i]n the absence of conflicting enactments of the other level
of government, the Court should avoid blocking the application of measures which are taken to be
enacted in furtherance of the public interest.”414 Finally, as will be examined below, the court has also
held that the doctrine of paramountcy “is much better suited to contemporary Canadian federalism
than is the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.”415

f) Interjurisdictional immunity
At its core, the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is an acknowledgement that a law is valid in most
applications, but in limited circumstances should be interpreted so as not to apply to a matter or activity
that is outside the enacting body’s jurisdiction.416 Unlike the paramountcy doctrine interjurisdictional
immunity does not require conflict to apply; rather, it acts to restrict the extent to which otherwise valid
legislation enacted by one order of government can interfere with or impact on the “basic core” of a
subject that falls under the jurisdiction of the other order.417 The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
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“recognizes that our Constitution is based on an allocation of exclusive powers to both levels of
government, not concurrent powers, although these powers are bound to interact in the realities of the
life of our Constitution.”418 The majority in Lafarge explains that the doctrine recognizes that “there are
circumstances in which the powers of one level of government must be protected against intrusions,
even incidental ones, by the other level.”419
An exception to the general rule that the legislation of one order of government may affect
matters beyond its jurisdiction,420 the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is applied to a law’s
application, by “reading down” a law so it does not apply to the subject matter that is within the
authority of the other order of government.421 Originating with regard to federally-incorporated
companies, the doctrine has had its “greatest success in the context of the application of provincial laws
to federal works and undertakings,” and “came to stand for the proposition that a provincial law could
not affect a vital part of the management and operation of a federal undertaking.”422 While in theory the
doctrine can apply to limit the intrusion of federal laws into areas of provincial authority, it has to date
exclusively been used to protect federal heads of power from intrusion by provincial laws.423
Canadian Western Bank greatly restricted the application of the doctrine. Because
interjurisdictional immunity is used to limit overlap between the orders of government, restricting its
use provides greater opportunity for overlap and cooperative federalism.424 In Canadian Western Bank,
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Binnie and Lebel JJ. described interjurisdictional immunity as “a doctrine of limited application.”425
Noting the formulation set out by Beetz J. in Bell Canada, who wrote that "classes of subject" in ss. 91
and 92 must be assured a "basic, minimum and unassailable content" (p. 839) immune from the
application of legislation enacted by the other level of government,”426 the majority found that the
doctrine is rooted in the word “exclusive” mentioned throughout sections 91 and 92 of The Constitution
Act, 1867.427 The underlying reasoning behind the doctrine is that if a power is exclusive, it cannot be
invaded by legislation by the other order of government, which gave rise to a “watertight
compartments” approach to federalism.428 It is based on a concern about the risk to the relative powers
of the orders of government, although the majority in Canadian Western Bank noted that the “dominant
tide” of constitutional doctrines has tended to favour approaches that put “greater emphasis on the
legitimate interplay between federal and provincial powers,” such as the pith and substance and double
aspect doctrines.429 The majority held that a broad application of the interjurisdictional immunity
doctrine results in practical problems and is inconsistent “with the flexible federalism that the
constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double aspect and federal paramountcy are designed to
promote.”430 Absent conflict, “the Court should avoid blocking the application of measures which are
taken to be enacted in furtherance of the public interest.”431
Justices Binnie and LeBel held that the doctrine should come into play when a law adopted by one
level of government impairs, rather than just affects, the core competence of the other level of
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government, or the “vital or essential part of an undertaking.”432 As an example of a matter that affects
the “vital or essential” nature of a matter within the legislative competence of another jurisdiction,
Binnie and LeBel JJ. referred to Bell Canada, in which the Court found that a provincial workers’
compensation scheme “is aimed at and regulates the management and operations” of federallyregulated undertakings and was therefore invalid.433 In Canadian Western Bank, it was “not credible” to
suggest that promotion of the insurance in question is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” for the
banks to carry out their work as banks under federal jurisdiction, and therefore the doctrine does not
apply.434 Types of measures that would impede activities that are absolutely indispensable or necessary
for carrying out a federally-regulated undertaking include imposing land use development controls on
airports, regulating access to banks, or requiring a license to board or disembark passengers from a
bus.435 On the other hand, requiring federally-regulated transport undertakings to comply with
provincial road and safety legislation does not impede a vital or essential federal interest.436 Having
reviewed the case law on the doctrine, the majority concluded that it has been and should be used with
restraint, and that “[a]lthough the doctrine is in principle applicable to all federal and provincial heads of
legislative authority, the case law demonstrates that its natural area of operation is in relation to those
heads of legislative authority that confer on Parliament power over enumerated federal things, people,
works or undertakings.”437 In other words, the majority reinforced the presumption that the doctrine is
more likely to apply to render provincial legislation inoperable to the extent that it conflicts with the
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exercise of federal regulatory authority than it is to apply to federal legislation where it conflicts with
validly enacted provincial laws, or to provincial legislation that interferes with federal functional powers.
Wright writes that the majority in Canadian Western Bank “reformulated its approach” to the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity in three ways: first, by raising the threshold so that it only
applies where “the basic, minimum and unassailable content” of a head of power would be impaired by
a regulatory measure enacted by another order of government; second, by finding that the doctrine
should be “reserved for situations already covered by precedent;” and third, by only applying the
doctrine after the paramountcy doctrine unless prior case law exists.438 Reasons for limiting the
application of the doctrine include: a reluctance for the courts to “define the possible scope” of broad
powers, such as that over matters of a local or private nature; to “avoid blocking the application of laws
which are taken to be enacted in the furtherance of the public interest;” a concern that the doctrine
risks creating “legal vacuums;” that the doctrine is inconsistent with the need for more “flexible
federalism;” because it can “create serious uncertainty” as it “requires judges to define the core of
legislative powers;” so that division of powers results do not operate asymmetrically to favour federal
jurisdiction over provincial authority; and because the doctrine is unnecessary, given the federal
Parliament’s ability to enact laws that could be upheld under the paramountcy doctrine.439
Prior to Canadian Western Bank, the Court had indicated a preference to limit the application of
the doctrine: for example, in OPSEU, Dickson C.J., in concurring reasons, held that “even though the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has arguably expanded since its company law origins, it is, in my
opinion, not a particularly compelling doctrine.”440 The Chief Justice referred to Hogg, who posits that
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the theory that federal heads of power operate “defensively” to deny power to the provinces is
inconsistent with the pith and substance doctrine, under which a provincial law may validly affect a
federal matter. Hogg also states that from a policy perspective, immunity of federal undertakings is
unnecessary because the federal Parliament can always enact laws that would be paramount to
provincial laws, thereby shielding federal undertakings from those provincial laws.441 Of the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, Dickson C.J. wrote:
The history of Canadian constitutional law has been to allow for a fair amount of interplay and
indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers. It is true that doctrines like
interjurisdictional and Crown immunity and concepts like "watertight compartments" qualify the
extent of that interplay. But it must be recognized that these doctrines and concepts have not
been the dominant tide of constitutional doctrines; rather they have been an undertow against
the strong pull of pith and substance, the aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained
approach to concurrency and paramountcy issues.442
Similarly, in both Mangat and Lafarge the Supreme Court preferred to apply the paramountcy
doctrine so as to not create a legal vacuum and to better protect both federal and provincial
jurisdiction.443 In Lafarge, the majority noted that in Bell Canada, the Court “restricted interjurisdictional
immunity to the “essential and vital elements” of undertakings, and that Beetz J. referred to a general
rule that works and things within federal authority, such as railways and “lands reserved for Indians,”
are subject to provincial laws provided “that the application of these provincial laws does not bear upon
those subjects in what makes them specifically of federal jurisdiction.”444 In its ordinary grammatical
sense, the term “vital” means “essential to the existence of something; absolutely indispensable or
necessary; extremely important, crucial,” while “essential” means “absolutely indispensable or
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necessary.”445 Thus the question in Lafarge was whether “federal jurisdiction over all development on
VPA lands within the port area of Vancouver, even non-Crown lands not used for shipping and
navigation purposes, is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to the discharge by the VPA of its
responsibilities in relation to federal “public property” or “navigation and shipping.””446 The majority
found that activities that indirectly support the port do not qualify as exclusive federal jurisdiction, and
as “interjurisdictional immunity is not essential to make [the relevant] federal powers effective for the
purposes for which they were conferred,” the appeal should be decided on the basis of the
paramountcy doctrine.447 It can be seen from the above that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
“operates to protect exclusive enclaves of legislative power,”448 but that courts are increasingly reluctant
to apply the doctrine, especially where to do so would risk upsetting the balance of power or creating
legal vacuums. As a result, while it may be within a court’s power to shield a federally-regulated
undertaking from the application of a provincial EA law, it is unlikely to do so unless the impugned law
sought to affect an essential or vital element of that undertaking. Moreover, given that the doctrine has
to date not been used to shield provincial matters from the application of federal legislation,449 it is
highly unlikely that a court would apply the doctrine to shield an undertaking from the application of a
federal EA law except perhaps where the federal encroachment was severe and constituted an
interference with an absolutely indispensable or necessary aspect of a provincial matter.
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g) The Constitution as a living tree
Also known as the doctrine of progressive interpretation, the “living tree” doctrine posits that “the
general language used to describe the classes of subjects (or heads of power) is not to be frozen in the
sense in which it would have been understood in 1867.”450 Essentially, the doctrine is a means of
ensuring that the Constitution can adapt to changes in Canadian society.451 The metaphor of the
Constitution as a living tree originated with Lord Sankey in the Persons case of 1930: “the BNA Act
planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”452 This
approach is more generally accepted than the “watertight compartments” or originalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation, which limit flexibility in overlap and in adapting the division of powers to
suit changing social and political realities.453 According to Hogg:
The idea underlying the doctrine of progressive interpretation is that the Constitution Act, 1867,
although undeniably a statute, is not a statute like any other: it is a “constituent” or “organic”
statute, which has to provide the basis for the entire government of a nation over a long period
of time. An inflexible interpretation, rooted in the past, would only serve to withhold necessary
powers from the Parliament or Legislatures, and deny remedies to hitherto unrecognized
victims of injustice.454
In the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada called the living tree doctrine “one
of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation.” 455 It preferred the living
tree doctrine over “originalism” (or “frozen concepts”), (which believes that courts are bound by an
“original understanding” of the constitution), in finding that marriage could include same-sex couples,
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and not be restricted to a union between a man and woman.456 In the Employment Insurance Reference,
the Supreme Court similarly adopted the “living tree” approach in upholding federal legislation
respecting maternity and paternity leave, and held that courts must take “a progressive approach to
ensure that Confederation can be adapted to new social realities.”457 It held that “the Court takes a
progressive approach to ensure that Confederation can be adapted to new social realities,” including
women’s employment and male parenting.458 Constitutional interpretation must still “be anchored in
the historical context of the provision,”459 but these cases demonstrate that as social – and
environmental – issues emerge and society’s priorities evolve, courts will apply a progressive
interpretation of the heads of power in order to advance societal objectives and federalism. Accordingly,
the doctrine would posit that a court should especially seek to accommodate overlap between next
generation EA legislation and provincial laws where the overlap pertains to pressing environmental
issues.

3.

Cooperative Federalism

As seen in the above section of this chapter, courts have increasingly preferred to accommodate overlap
between legislation enacted by the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures. Tensions among
competing federal and provincial governments and tensions arising out of the fragmentation of the
environment among various heads of power gives rise to the need for interjurisdictional cooperation,
both in the pursuit of national harmony and in order to achieve environmental and sustainability
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objectives.460 This cooperation – known as “cooperative federalism” – can be achieved at the political
level through intergovernmental agreement, or through the courts as they attempt to reconcile the legal
framing of the Constitution with political, social and policy objectives and realities. This next section
examines cooperative federalism as understood in the academic literature and as promoted by the
courts in an effort to illuminate how a federal next generation EA law might – or might not – align with
cooperative federalism principles set out in the case law.
Many commentators have argued that intergovernmental cooperation is necessary for effective
and efficient environmental management in Canada.461 While individual provincial regimes may be more
stringent than federal action, regional divergence means that the federal government cannot “depend
on unreliable state co-operation” that might jeopardize national efforts on matters, especially in cases
where some or all provinces may lack the resources or political will to achieve desired or necessary
results.462 Effective federal-provincial cooperation respects the constitutional division of powers, seeks
to balance unity with diversity, and facilitates intergovernmental dialogue and shared decision-making
on matters of mutual concern.463 Lederman describes cooperative federalism as “complementary
federal and provincial statutes co-ordinated by virtue of custom, practice or intergovernmental
agreements of some sort,”464 pursuant to which the federal and provincial governments come to
agreement on complementary approaches to environmental management, response and decisionmaking.465 This need for diplomacy and dialogue has caused the federal and provincial governments to
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enter into “several hundred federal-provincial agreements on the environment as well as informal
agreements,”466 which recognize the constitutional authority of both orders of government and seek to
avoid duplication and encourage mutually-reinforcing gains.467
While cooperative federalism at the political level has received much attention in the academic
literature, judicial consideration of cooperative federalism is critical to understanding how a court might
interpret federal jurisdiction over next generation EA. Increasingly over the decades, courts have looked
to the principle of cooperative federalism to guide their analysis on jurisdictional questions. The
relationship between political attention to cooperative federalism and judicial treatment of are
mutually-reinforcing: cooperative federalism at the political level requires a shared understanding of the
distribution of legislative powers that is aided by judicial guidance, while the jurisprudence has evolved
in Canada to increasingly reflect social and political advantages of shared authority.468
The Constitution of Canada includes both its written texts and supporting unwritten rules and
principles that govern the interpretation of constitutional authority.469 Federalism is one of those
unwritten principles, one that has been “discovered” by the courts to help guide division of powers
questions.470 As part of its evolving understanding of federalism, the Supreme Court of Canada appears
to be increasingly intent on facilitating intergovernmental dialogue.471 In the 1980s and 1990s, the
Supreme Court stressed the need to reject the “watertight compartments” model of federalism that
viewed the enumerated heads of power as exclusive enclaves, and indicated a preference for
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recognizing concurrent or overlapping powers.472 After the appointment of McLachlin J. as Chief in 2000,
the Supreme Court shifted more prominently towards encouraging cooperative federalism and
intergovernmental dialogue, beginning with the Firearms Reference. In that case, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that “overlap of legislation [was] to be expected and accommodated in a federal state.”473
A few years later in the Employment Insurance Reference it stated that it must take a progressive
approach to identifying the head of power “to ensure that Confederation can be adapted to new social
realities,”474 although cooperative federalism cannot be used to encroach on provincial constitutional
authority.475 At issue was whether Parliament has constitutional authority to grant maternity and
parental benefits.476 The Court rejected the “watertight compartments” approach in favour of the
“double aspect” doctrine (discussed in the next section, below),477 and in doing so cautioned against
judicial imposition of personal or political values:
To derive the evolution of constitutional powers from the structure of Canada is delicate, as
what that structure is will often depend on a given court's view of what federalism is. What are
regarded as the characteristic features of federalism may vary from one judge to another, and
will be based on political rather than legal notions. The task of maintaining the balance between
federal and provincial powers falls primarily to governments. If an issue comes before a court,
the court must refer to the framers' description of the power in order to identify its essential
components, and must be guided by the way in which courts have interpreted the power in the
past. In this area, the meaning of the words used may be adapted to modern-day realities, in a
manner consistent with the separation of powers of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches.478 [emphasis added]
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Wright interprets this finding as an indication that the Court is concerned that judge-based assignments
of power will be “informed by politics” rather than law, and that “it is considerably more comfortable
leaving such line-drawing exercises to the political branches, as much as possible.”479
The growing trend in the above-mentioned cases led to the seminal decision in Canadian Western
Bank which, as described above, “significantly restricted the application of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity” in favour of a judicial approach to the division of powers that encourages
and supports cooperative federalism by limiting when courts will intervene to find a law ultra vires an
order of government.480 Justices Binnie and LeBel, writing for the majority, identified three
“fundamental objectives” of Canadian federalism:481 to reconcile the “legal recognition of the diversity
of the original members” of the federation with the need for national unity; to “promote democratic
participation by reserving meaningful powers to the local or regional level; and “to foster co-operation
among governments and legislatures for the common good.”482 The Constitution is a “living tree,” and
the interpretation and interrelation of the constitutional heads of power “must evolve and be tailored to
the changing political and cultural realities of Canadian society,” guided by the principle of federalism
“in light of the fundamental values it was the designed to serve.”483
This flexible approach to federalism was reiterated in the 2011 Securities Act Reference, in which
the Supreme Court held that the federal Securities Act, aimed at regulating the trade in securities, which
comes under provincial authority as a matter of property and civil rights, was not a valid exercise of
federal power. The Court in that case acknowledged that it had adopted a “more flexible view of
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federalism that accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and encourages intergovernmental
cooperation,”484 but reiterated that flexibility and cooperation “cannot override or modify the
separation of powers.”485 In this case, the need to maintain an appropriate balance in the constitutional
division of powers outweighed the goals of flexibility and cooperation:
… notwithstanding the Court’s promotion of cooperative and flexible federalism, the
constitutional boundaries that underlie the division of powers must be respected. The
“dominant tide” of flexible federalism, however strong its pull may be, cannot sweep designated
powers out to sea, nor erode the constitutional balance inherent in the Canadian federal
state.”486
In the 2015 Firearms Reference,487 the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether it was within
the federal Parliament’s authority to destroy data from the long gun registry without transferring that
data to provinces that requested it. The majority rejected Quebec’s argument that cooperative
federalism operated as a bar on unilateral federal action that hinders federal-provincial cooperation,
holding that the principle of cooperative federalism “cannot… be seen as imposing limits on the
otherwise valid exercise of legislative competence.”488 Cooperative federalism has been relied on in
relaxing a rigid, watertight compartments approach to division of powers, but it does not supersede the
written text of the Constitution.489 It also does not “impose a positive obligation to facilitate cooperation
where the constitutional division of powers authorizes unilateral action,” and so cannot be relied on to
require Canada to share its long gun registry data with the provinces.490 Justices Lebel, Wagner and
Gascon disagreed (with Abella J concurring), describing cooperative federalism as a reflection of “the
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realities of an increasingly complex society that requires the enactment of co-ordinated federal and
provincial legislative schemes to better deal with the local needs of unity and diversity.”491 They
reasoned that the provincial and federal governments had formed a partnership with respect to the
registry, a partnership that was “within the spirit of co-operative federalism,”492 and one order of
government cannot unilaterally dismantle that cooperative scheme without taking into account the
impact on the balance of powers.493
Finally, the Supreme Court in the Pan-Canadian Securities Reference494 held that cooperative
federalism is “an interpretive aid” used to consider how the allocation of powers in a particular
legislative circumstance may affect the balance of power.495 The Court reiterated that cooperative
federalism cannot “be used to make ultra vires legislation intra vires, but it does encourage
intergovernmental cooperation and can be applied “to facilitate interlocking federal and provincial
legislative schemes.”496 Federalism is “a set of boundaries within which provinces and the federal
government are free to give full effect to “Canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and
cooperative flexibility.”497 So long as the provincial and federal governments are working within those
boundaries, and so long as they are working in tandem, a cooperative legislative scheme may jointly
provide both orders of government to legislate a matter that may be outside of one order’s power on its
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own. As we turn to the analysis of federal jurisdiction over next generation EA, this evolving model of
cooperative federalism will be an underlying principle throughout.498

498
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IV.
1.

Federal Jurisdiction over Next Generation EA
Constitutional Basis of Next Generation EA

In Oldman, the Supreme Court considered whether the EARPGO was a valid exercise of federal
legislative power under section 91 of The Constitution Act, 1867.499 Writing for the majority, La Forest J.
rejected the claim that EAs are a “constitutional Trojan horse enabling the federal government, on the
pretext of some narrow ground of federal jurisdiction, to conduct a far-ranging inquiry into matters that
are exclusively within provincial jurisdiction.”500 Rather, the EARPGO simply required federal authorities
with decision-making responsibility over an undertaking to consider more factors when exercising their
authority.501 Justice La Forest defined the pith and substance of the EARPGO as a process setting out
how federal decision-makers must exercise their authority under various heads of federal power.502 As a
result, EA is auxiliary in nature and can “only affect matters that are “truly in relation to an institution or
activity that is otherwise within [federal] legislative jurisdiction”.”503 Accordingly, the EARPGO was
supported by whichever head – or heads – of power an EA is triggered under, and was an “adjunct” of
federal powers enumerated in section 91.504
Justice La Forest also stated that the EARPGO was justified under the residuary aspect of
POGG.505 By residuary, he meant not that federal EA was a matter of national concern, pertained to a
national emergency or filled in a constitutional gap (the three branches of the POGG power),506 but
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rather that, as held in Jones v Attorney General of New Brunswick,507 POGG conferred on Parliament
authority “to legislate in relation to the operation and administration of the institutions and agencies of
the Parliament and Government of Canada.”508 In other words, because the EARPGO simply prescribes
processes and factors for federal authorities to consider when determining whether to exercise a
statutory decision under various heads of power, it can be upheld both under those various powers as
well as by the authority conferred under POGG for federal institutions to “administer their multifarious
duties and functions.509 Indeed, La Forest J. reiterated his dissenting opinion in Crown Zellerbach that
environmental control “does not have the requisite distinctiveness to meet the test under the “national
concern” doctrine” of POGG.510
While as planning tools the EARPGO and next generation EA share many features, the scope of
next generation EA and its broader application would make a next generation EA law differ from the
EARPGO in pith and substance and, potentially, in its classification under federal powers. In particular,
unlike EARPGO, next generation EA does not necessarily require the exercise of federal authority (such
as regulatory permitting, funding, or existence of a federal proponent) in order for an assessment to be
triggered, leaving open the question of whether it could similarly be upheld under enumerated heads of
power. As noted above, La Forest J.’s rationale for upholding the EARPGO under various heads appears
to stem from the fact that the exercise of valid federal authority was a prerequisite to falling under the
Order, whereas next generation EA requires assessments of all undertakings with implications on
sustainability.511
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In its breadth of scope and lack of a federal regulatory trigger, next generation EA is analogous
to the IAA, which also does not require the exercise of federal authority in order to trigger an
assessment, and which does require a broad range of factors. Assessments are triggered by a project
being listed in the Regulations Designating Physical Activities,512 where they are described by project
type and magnitude (e.g., metal mines of a certain production capacity, or railways of a minimum length
along a new right of way). Once triggered, the IAA requires assessments to consider all positive and
negative environmental, social, economic, and health effects of designated projects, as well as whether
the project fosters sustainability.513 At the end of the assessment, the Minister of Environment and
Climate Change or Governor in Council (as the case may be) must determine whether the adverse
federal, direct or indirect effects are in the public interest in light of five enumerated factors: the extent
to which the project fosters sustainability, the extent to which it contributes to or hinders Canada’s
ability to meet its environmental and climate obligations, mitigation measures, impacts on Indigenous
rights, and the extent to which the adverse federal, direct or indirect effects are in the public interest.514
Section 7 of the Act prohibits proponents from carrying out work related to the project that may result
in federal impacts until the assessment has concluded and the federal, direct or indirect effects have
been approved. Purposes of the Act include fostering sustainability, protecting environmental, social,
health and economic conditions that are within federal authority, accounting for all positive and adverse
effects of designated projects, and ensuring “that designated projects that require the exercise of a
power or performance of a duty or function by a federal authority under any Act of Parliament other
than this Act to be carried out, are considered in a careful and precautionary manner to avoid adverse
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effects within federal jurisdiction and adverse direct or incidental effects.”515 As Nature Canada, an
intervenor in the Alberta reference case respecting the constitutionality of the IAA, argues, together, the
decision-making, section 7 prohibition and purposes provision demonstrate that “the IAA is structured
to focus not on projects, but on federal effects and effects that are directly related or necessarily
incidental to an exercise of federal authority or federal funding in relation to a designated project.”516
Moreover, the requirement under the IAA to assess alternatives to the project and alternative means of
carrying it out enables proponents to alter the project’s design so as to minimize or avoid adverse
federal effects and effects that are directly linked or incidental to the exercise of federal authority, and a
court is likely to consider any effects on provincial jurisdiction incidental to the Act’s intended effect of
“understanding, avoiding, mitigating or justifying federal, direct or incidental effects.”517 Thus, Nature
Canada describes the pith and substance of the IAA as a “tool for ensuring that the effects of projects
with potential to impact federal jurisdiction are considered in an informed and precautionary manner in
order to enable federal authorities to protect the environmental, social, health and economic conditions
within Parliament’s authority and determine whether federal, direct or incidental effects are in the
public interest.”518
Like the EARPGO and IAA, a next generation federal EA law could be designed to ensure that its
pith and substance is in relation to federal heads of power. As noted in Chapter II, a key purpose of next
generation EA is to “ensure net contributions to sustainability” of all relevant environmental, social,
economic and health factors and their interactions,519 including cumulative effects.520 It does so by
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applying sustainability criteria and trade-off rules to the comparative evaluation of alternatives in order
to select the alternative that enhances socio-economic and environmental benefits while avoiding
unwanted negative effects.521 Next generation EA should be applied to all undertakings at the project,
strategic and regional levels that have implications on sustainability,522 but to provide the necessary
nexus between next generation EA and federal constitutional authority a federal next generation EA law
could focus the application of assessment to undertakings with potential implications on areas of federal
jurisdiction and decisions on avoiding, mitigating or justifying those impacts (see the next section for a
discussion of the scope of federal jurisdiction to trigger an EA). As such, the pith and substance of next
generation EA could be described as a tool for ensuring that undertakings with potential for federal,
direct or incidental effects foster sustainability by ensuring that decisions with respect to federal effects
are made in light of all the undertaking’s potential effects.523
Having defined a plausible pith and substance of a next generation EA law, the next step is to
determine whether it could be upheld under a head of federal power.524 By narrowing its application to
undertakings with implications on federal heads of power, next generation EA could, like the EARPGO,
be found to be an adjunct of relevant federal heads of power and the residuary aspect of POGG.525 It
should be immaterial that unlike the EARPGO, which triggered EAs on the basis of an exercise of federal
authority made elsewhere (i.e., not under the EARPGO), a next generation EA law would apply to all
undertakings with potential for federal effects, regardless of whether those projects require federal
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regulatory approval or federal funding, occur on federal lands or have a federal proponent. Federal
jurisdiction stems from the Constitution, not from exercises of legislative authority made pursuant to
constitutional powers. To require an exercise of legislative power in order to find jurisdiction would be
putting the constitutional cart before the horse. Doing so would also risk the legal vacuums of which the
courts are wary,526 as any undertakings not regulated under federal statute that could have federal
effects would go unassessed. It would also run contrary to the court’s recognition that the Constitution
must be interpreted in a manner that reflects emerging social and biophysical realities, realities that
may not yet be legislated or require a regulatory decision.527
However, while federal jurisdiction over next generation EA should not flow from pre-existing
federal regulatory power, it must flow from a head of power. A federal next generation EA law could be
upheld under various federal heads of power providing it provides a “necessary element of proximity”
between EA and subject matters of federal jurisdiction.528 Additionally, given the presumption of
constitutionality, a court interpreting a next generation federal EA law should be restrained in
determining that the law is ultra vires.529 Thus, where that necessary element of proximity exits, a
reviewing court could interpret a next generation EA statute in such a manner that confines its
application to a head or heads of federal authority;530 in other words, as an adjunct under various heads
of federal power, with federal authority under the law being confined to matters that directly or
incidentally affect those heads. Therefore, while the pith and substance of next generation EA differs
somewhat from that of the EARPGO, its assignment to federal constitutional powers would be similar: as
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an adjunct of enumerated heads of power. These heads would include such heads as the federal
fisheries and navigation powers and federal powers interprovincial projects and pollution, and
potentially the residual aspect of POGG. In Oldman, La Forest J. described that residuary character as
pertaining to the operation and administration of institutions,531 which in the case of a next generation
federal EA law could be used to support the administrative functions of next generation EA.

2.

Scope of Federal Jurisdiction under Next Generation EA Legislation

Having established the likely jurisdictional bases for next generation EA, the next step is to examine the
extent of federal authority under those valid heads of power for project assessment, RA and SA. This
section breaks that analysis into three stages: triggering, information-gathering and analysis, and
decision-making.

a) Triggering
Project EA

La Forest J. in Oldman made it clear that a federal assessment must be rooted in federal constitutional
authority.532 He found that the EARPGO was only engaged where a proposal requires a regulatory
decision by the federal government, and not “every time there is some potential environmental effect
on a matter of federal jurisdiction.”533 Of course, La Forest J. was describing the EARPGO’s regulatory
scheme rather than the extent of federal authority, and so while Oldman makes it clear that an
affirmative regulatory duty is a constitutionally valid EA trigger, it does not address the question of
authority to trigger an EA where there is a potential impact on an area of federal constitutional authority
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but a regulatory authorization is not required.534 As noted above, next generation EA should be applied
to all undertakings with implications on sustainability,535 but if the above analysis is correct that a next
generation federal EA law would, like the EARPGO, be supported by the various section 91 heads under
which an EA is triggered,536 it stands to reason that the trigger must relate to one or more section 91
heads. In other words, federal jurisdiction to trigger an EA must flow from a federal subject matter.
What remains unanswered is what degree of certainty is required that an undertaking will involve
federal jurisdiction at the triggering stage?
Reviewing the case law and the literature on EA, it appears likely that the courts would find
broad federal authority to trigger a next generation EA even where need for regulatory approval or
impacts on areas of federal authority are not immediately clear, and even where the project does not
have other obvious jurisdictional hooks (such as federal lands, proponent or funding). As a planning tool,
next generation EA occurs at the earliest stages of decision-making, before information about potential
impacts on areas of federal jurisdiction may be known. 537 As Justice La Forest described in Oldman, EA is
“essentially an information gathering process”538 to inform decision making. Projects’ impacts – and
therefore the question of whether those impacts will affect federal interests – often cannot be fully
known and understood until after an assessment is completed.539 Requiring federal authorities to obtain
evidence of a project’s effects prior to the assessment would be to put the cart before the Constitutional
horse and undermine the objectives of precaution and sustainability.
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Secondly, review panel reports are not reviewable on the basis that no legal right or interest has
yet been affected, which suggests there may be judicial preference to let triggers stand and wait to see
whether there is a jurisdictional basis for a decision. In Gitxaala, the Federal Court of Appeal held that
judicial review does not lie with reports made under the National Energy Board Act as the reports only
make recommendations and therefore do not carry legal consequences.540 In that case, the Court found
that the decision-making process was triggered by the statutory requirement for a proponent to apply
for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN).541 A similar decision was made by the
Federal Court in Alberta Wilderness Association v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), which held
that assessment reports under CEAA are simply an essential but preliminary statutory step in an
assessment, not a decision or order.542 While procedurally a legislative or regulatory trigger for an
assessment differs from an assessment report in that the trigger is a statutory requirement that is not
immune from judicial review, these cases do suggest that the courts are inclined to wait until the
decision stage, during which the decision-maker can determine that he or she has no constitutional
authority to reject or impose conditions on a project. This rationale is not posed as a potential bar on
judicial review at the triggering stage, but rather a factor the court is likely to take into account.
Relatedly, assessment authorities have power to scope assessments, and so where the
jurisdictional hook is low (e.g., there is only uncertain potential for low-level impacts on areas of federal
authority), the assessment can be scoped to focus only on potential effects related to those areas, and
the activities that would result in those effects. Through scoping, assessment authorities can tailor the
assessment to the magnitude and likelihood of risk, lessening the burden on proponents as well as the
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risk that the assessment will far exceed the scope of federal authority affected.543 Fourthly, the Supreme
Court of Canada has looked to the precautionary principle in upholding environmental legislation in
division of powers cases,544 and may be inclined to recognize the precautionary principle in the nature of
next generation EA. As with the other reasons, the precautionary principle itself is not a legally
compelling reason to override federalism, but a court could follow it in justifying a decision that federal
jurisdiction need not be certain, only reasonably likely, at the triggering stage. This recognition of the
precautionary principle is analogous to the trend in recent decades of the Supreme Court according the
federal government jurisdictional latitude to deal with environmental issues in recognition of the need
for both orders of government to be at the table when environmental protection is concerned.545
Finally, as noted above, federal jurisdiction stems from section 91 of the Constitution, not from the
existence of a legislative scheme. To require regulatory approval for a project under another statute as
proof of federal jurisdiction would risk legal vacuums, as not all projects with federal implications may
be regulated elsewhere.546 Indeed, it could be argued that absence of federal regulatory approval
actually enhances the rationale for next generation federal EA, as unregulated impacts on areas of
federal authority would otherwise go unscrutinized.
Instead, the jurisdictional threshold for triggering a federal EA should be reasonable probability
of federal effects or other means of federal authority. This approach is consistent with the presumption
of constitutionality, which, as seen above, holds that a law is intra vires unless it is proved to be invalid.
According to the presumption, a decision to trigger an EA should be presumed to be valid providing that
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there is a rational basis for the trigger.547 This approach is reflected in Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v
Canada (Minister of the Environment),548 which suggests that effects on areas within federal jurisdiction
need not be established to trigger an assessment. In that case, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the
EARPGO applied to two dams on the basis of their potential to have transboundary impacts. While the
case was not about federal jurisdiction, the Federal Court of Appeal noted that the responsible minister
was not aware of the potential federal impacts before deciding that the EARPGO did not apply, but the
Court held that the Order applied nonetheless.549 It is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s
approach in Hydro-Québec,550 in which La Forest J. held that the constitution “should be so interpreted
as to afford both levels of government ample means to protect the environment while maintaining the
general structure of the Constitution.”551 An early trigger based on reasonable probability of federal
effects would afford the federal government ample means to protect the environmental components
within its power, or broader environmental effects resulting from federally-regulated projects, while
maintaining the ability to stop the assessment should it become clear that the undertaking will not
implicate areas of federal jurisdiction.
A broad trigger based only on reasonable probability of federal effects also aligns with the pith
and substance doctrine, which holds that a law’s subject matter is to be gleaned from its purpose and
effects.552 The fundamental purpose of next generation project EA is to aid in the project planning
process and inform subsequent decision-making553 so that decisions minimize federal impacts and
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enhance benefits so any residual impacts are justified.554 To achieve that objective, EA must occur
concurrently with project planning and begin early, before impacts on areas of federal jurisdiction may
be known. To assess a project only once federal effects have been identified – and therefore after
project planning decisions may already have been made – would undermine EA’s ability to avoid
unwanted federal effects and be conducted collaboratively with provincial authorities.555 Indeed, an
early trigger would facilitate multijurisdictional cooperation,556 as it would afford federal authorities
more opportunities to seek collaboration with provincial authorities and greater prospects for designing
mutually-acceptable processes and projects, an objective promoted by the courts in environmental
division of powers cases.557 Accordingly, an early trigger based on reasonable probability of federal
effects (as well as other sources of federal powers, such as federal proponency or federal authority over
the project, such as railways) would likely maintain the balance between federal and provincial interests.
Regional and Strategic EA

The above principles apply equally with respect to regional and strategic assessments. The jurisdictional
threshold for deciding whether to trigger an RA or SA should be potential for reasonable probability of
effects on areas of federal authority or of other federal jurisdictional hooks (such as activities being on
federal lands or having a federal proponent or federal funding).558 Given the interactive nature of
cumulative effects and the presumption that all effects should be considered cumulative unless proven
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otherwise,559 to limit federal authority to trigger an RA or SA to only where effects on federal jurisdiction
are known or likely would be contrary to the precautionary principle and result in impoverished
understandings of cumulative effects on areas within federal jurisdiction. In fact, the constitutional basis
for federal RA and SA will generally be stronger, as the effects of undertakings not typically regulated by
the federal government (e.g., forestry) will be more apparent when viewed cumulatively.
To answer the question raised in Chapter II, the federal government likely does have jurisdiction
to trigger the SATCM. While the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada recommended against assessing
the expansion of the Vista thermal coal mine,560 it did conclude that thermal coal mines have the
potential for impacts on areas of federal jurisdiction,561 and cumulative effects, themselves significant,
may be caused by individually minor effects.562 While the SATCM terms of reference are not yet
finalized, as discussed in Chapter II, SA is not applied to individual projects, but rather is undertaken
either of policies, plans or programs, or of collections of project types.563 Thus while thermal coal mining
proponents may elect to participate in the SATCM, no provincial or proponent interests should be
affected by the mere triggering of the assessment, and a court would likely determine that it is
premature at the triggering stage to declare a strategic assessment invalid.564 Even were a federal
authority to trigger a SA of a provincial policy, plan or program (for example, a provincial utility’s
559
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integrated resources plan), that trigger would likely be valid so long as there is potential for the policy,
plan or program to impact on federal matters.
Similarly, the federal decision to trigger the Ring of Fire RA was likely valid, despite the fact that
the RA will predominantly occur on provincial lands.565 The RA was triggered pursuant to requests citing
concerns that two proposed road projects into the region have the potential to induce mining
development that in turn could lead to significant impacts on areas of federal authority, such as
fisheries, Indigenous peoples, migratory birds and international effects,566 and will function as a tool for
the federal Minister of Environment and Climate Change to assess those effects collectively and better
ensure the sustainability of federal matters in the region.567 It is difficult to imagine a region in Canada in
which all projects and activities would not result in cumulative effects on federal matters, but as with
project triggering, federal authority to trigger a regional EA is likely based on reasonable probability of
federal effects, rather than proof of effects.

b) Information-gathering and analysis
Project EA

Information-gathering and analysis lie at the heart of EA. While EA may be perceived as and used simply
as an information-gathering tool for generating and revealing information about the external costs of
development prior to project approval,568 it is generally also held to be a mechanism for ensuring better
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decisions about whether and under what conditions to allow proposals to proceed.569 More recently, EA
has also been recognized as an important public disclosure tool, in addition to being a planning tool.570
In Greenpeace Canada v Canada (AG), Russel J. for the Federal Court distinguished between the
information-gathering and decision-making stages of EA, holding:
The most important role for a review panel is to provide an evidentiary basis for decisions that
must be taken by Cabinet and responsible authorities. The jurisprudence establishes that
gathering, disclosing, and holding hearings to assemble and assess this evidentiary foundation is
an independent duty of a review panel, and failure to discharge it undermines the ability of the
Cabinet and responsible authorities to discharge their own duties under the Act.571
Benidickson identifies three types of scoping that occurs during an assessment: scope of undertaking
(what components of a project or activity are assessed), scope of assessment (what activities related to
the undertaking get assessed, such as upstream or downstream activities), and scope of factors to be
considered.572 Kwasniak and Mascher include both a project’s component and related activities in their
definition of scope of project,573 an approach followed in this thesis. Broad scoping of both factors
considered and project components and activities aligns with next generation EA principles. Gibson et al
state that assessments should include a consideration of “the full suite of considerations that affect the
potential for progress towards sustainability,” including all positive and negative, direct and indirect,
cumulative, interactive and individual, immediate and long-term, biophysical and socio-economic effects
and their interactions.574 Benidickson agrees, also arguing that a broad project scope “will lead to a
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broader, more encompassing environmental assessment, whereas a narrower, more restricted
approach to the scope of a project will confine the ambit of the associated environmental
assessment.”575
As an information-gathering tool to inform federal decisions, La Forest J. suggested that the scope
of information that may be taken into account in an EA will vary depending on the head of power
involved.576 In La Forest J.’s words:
… since the nature of the various heads of power under the Constitution Act, 1867, differ, the
extent to which environmental concerns may be taken into account in the exercise of a power
may vary from one power to another. For example, a somewhat different environmental role can
be played by Parliament in the exercise of its jurisdiction over fisheries than under its powers
concerning railways or navigation since the former involves the management of a resource, the
others activities.”577 [emphasis added]
This approach to federal environmental jurisdiction stems from Fowler and Northwest Falling, which as
noted above require an exercise of the federal fisheries power to be rooted in actual or potential harm
to fisheries, and cannot be extended to blanket prohibitions of activities that are “not sufficiently linked
to any actual or potential harm.”578 In summary, because the environment is a diffuse matter that
touches on numerous different heads of power, federal environmental authority is rooted in its
authority under the different heads assigned to it under section 91, and is therefore related to the
nature of those heads (whether the nature is resource or activity) and circumscribed by them.579
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Some suggest that Oldman indicates that where an assessment is rooted in a valid exercise of
federal constitutional authority, the scope of factors that may be considered is extensive.580 Kennett, on
the other hand, argues that a distinction should be made in the possible scope of an assessment
“between activities over which Parliament has “comprehensive” environmental jurisdiction and
activities which, because they merely touch on or have consequences for an area of federal
competence, are subject to only “restricted” jurisdiction.”581 Heads of power respecting federallyregulated activities with environmental consequences, such as railways, give rise to comprehensive
jurisdiction, whereas heads related to resources, such as fisheries, give rise to what Kennett calls
restricted federal jurisdiction.582 Where the federal government has comprehensive jurisdiction, such as
over railways, navigation, and activities “referred to by implication in a federal head of power” (e.g.,
interprovincial projects), it may regulate with respect to all of that activity’s environmental and socioeconomic effects.583 But where the relevant head of power relates to natural resources (e.g., fisheries)
or activities that affect a federally-regulated activity (such as depositing substances into navigable
waters), Kennett argues that restricted federal jurisdiction limits the federal government to only
addressing consequences for that subject matter.584 In those cases, “legislation relating in "pith and
substance" to fisheries, navigation and shipping, or Indians and lands reserved for Indians may have
incidental implications for dam-building” or other natural resource projects, but there are restrictions on
the extent of the federal authority.585 That said, Kennett does claim that the federal Parliament has
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authority to “veto or attach stringent conditions to certain projects” over which it has restricted
jurisdiction, providing that a “significant link has been established” between the reason for the veto or
the conditions and an area within federal jurisdiction.586 Judicial control thus occurs through the “pith
and substance” doctrine, which would find that imposing restrictions on dam building that are
unconnected to a federal head of power are not in pith and substance concerned with a matter of
federal jurisdiction.587
Doelle suggests that Kennett’s interpretation of Oldman “would give no weight to the very strong
statements at the start of the [Oldman] decision suggesting a progressive interpretation of federal
jurisdiction to enable integrated decision-making unless to do so would be an invasion of provincial
jurisdiction.”588 Indeed, La Forest J. does not himself distinguish between restricted and comprehensive
environmental jurisdiction, or suggest that the scope of federal jurisdiction may be any more or less
depending on the head of power. It is true that La Forest J. distinguished between “activity” heads (e.g.,
navigation) and “resource” heads (e.g., fisheries),589 but only to illustrate the point that environmental
roles vary according to the nature of the head of power, not to suggest that jurisdiction is somehow
more limited where the matter relates to a resource. Indeed, it seems logical that regardless of whether
federal jurisdiction is over an activity (such as a fishery) or an impact (such as a mine’s impact on a
fishery), the extent of jurisdiction is the same.
There is a strong argument that the scope both of factors and of project is vast in the informationgathering and analysis stage. According to MacLean et al., there is likely no jurisdictional limit on the
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scope of information that may be considered in an assessment, and jurisdictional limits are instead
relevant at the decision-making stage.590 In Oldman, it was important for La Forest J. that the EARPGO
only required responsible authorities to consider environmental matters within federal jurisdiction, and
the socio-economic impacts directly related to areas of federal responsibility affected by proposals;
“[t]hus, an initiating department or panel cannot use the Guidelines Order as a colourable device to
invade areas of provincial jurisdiction which are unconnected to the relevant heads of federal power.”591
Also important was the fact that the EARPGO only required the assessment of social effects that are
“directly related” to potential environmental effects within federal jurisdiction, and where the
assessment trigger is an impact on an area of federal jurisdiction (such as fisheries) rather than being
located on federal land, receiving federal funding or having a federal proponent, it limited the
environmental effects to be studied to those that may impact on areas of federal responsibility.592
However, La Forest J. also does appear to find that where matters do relate to an area of federal
jurisdiction, authorities may consider all information relevant to that matter. For example, he holds that
the federal power over railways includes the authority to consider all social, environmental, and
economic ramifications of railway decisions.593 It similarly seems logical that when considering the
impacts of undertakings on resources, the federal government may consider all of a project’s positive
and adverse environmental and socio-economic effects in order to have a comprehensive picture to
inform decision making.594
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Justice La Forest held that exercises of legislative power respecting environmental matters must
be linked to an appropriate head of power, just as other matters must be. Responsible authorities must
consider matters within their purview when deciding whether to issue a permit or authorization under
their respective regulatory power (such as impacts on fish when deciding whether to issue an
authorization under the Fisheries Act), and EA simply adds to the list of federal matters those decisionmakers must consider.595 He found that it is not helpful to characterize undertakings as “provincial
projects,” or projects “primarily subject to provincial regulation,” and that there is no general doctrine
of interjurisdictional immunity that shields provincial projects from valid federal legislation.596 Each
order of government may legislate in regard to aspects of a matter pertaining to their respective
authorities, meaning that the federal government may have a decision-making role with natural
resource projects that impact on areas of federal jurisdiction.597 He defined EA as “a planning tool that is
now generally regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making,” comprised of “both an
information-gathering and a decision-making component which provide the decision-maker with an
objective basis for granting or denying approval for a proposed development.”598
The rationale for considering all relevant effects appears in La Forest J.’s recognition that many
projects requiring a permit under federal navigation legislation, such as dams or bridges, do not improve
waterway navigation, and so require the minister to “weigh the advantages and disadvantages resulting
from interference with navigation,” jobs or restricted navigability.599 Similarly, where a project such as a
mine will impact fish and fish habitat, it is unlikely that those impacts will be positive. Thus, the process
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of environmental decision-making usually involves a process of justification, wherein negative impacts
on an area of constitutional authority (such as navigation or fisheries) must be found to be outweighed
by (usually) socio-economic benefits. Inherent in federal environmental decision-making of all projects,
then, regardless of whether the project is a federally-regulated activity such as a railway or a project
that merely impacts on a head of power like fisheries, is the consideration of benefits that will flow from
the activity and that will (or will not) outweigh the negative impacts on fish, navigation or another area
of federal responsibility.600 As Bowden and Olszynski argue, to suggest that jobs and revenue are within
federal powers to consider but broader environmental and social impacts are not is “to suggest that the
Constitution is inherently and permanently biased towards an out-dated and discredited model for
economic growth – a seemingly untenable position.”601 It stands to reason that if the federal
government may consider the socio-economic benefits of all projects over which it has some
constitutional authority, it may also consider the negative socio-economic impacts, as those are also
relevant to the justification analysis – indeed, in La Forest J.’s words, it “defies reason” to hold
otherwise.602 As La Forest J. held, because the location of railways may have socio-economic effects and
impacts on air quality and noise pollution, it is relevant to consider those broader matters in an
assessment of a proposed railway.603 This approach is consistent with Nakina (Township) v Canadian
National Railway Co.,604 in which the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Railway Transport
Committee of the Canadian Transport Commission erred in deciding it could not take into account the
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socio-economic effects of a proposed railway station closure.605 Similarly, it is only logical that for a
project like a dam or mine, where federal authority is rooted in federal effects, the federal government
may also consider a broad spectrum of environmental, social and economic effects in order to
determine whether the benefits of approving the harm outweigh the impacts themselves.
Regarding scope of project, as Doelle says, the question is “whether and how far the federal
environmental assessment can look beyond the proposal that requires federal regulatory approval.”606
The same principles that apply to the scope of factors analysis apply to the scope of project, and Quebec
(Attorney General) v Canada (National Energy Board) provides some guidance here, too. It is notable
that in that case, the Court upheld an NEB decision to require an assessment of a future upstream
energy production facility as a condition of the export license.607 This decision is “very much in line with
the interpretation of Oldman… the jurisdictional issue is relevant to determine whether a federal project
decision can be made, not what environmental impacts may be considered when exercising that
decision-making authority.”608 Similarly, in Sumas Energy 2, Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board),609
the Federal Court of Appeal held that the NEB has jurisdiction to consider the potential environmental
effects within Canada of a power plant located outside Canada. Sumas Energy 2 had applied for a CPCN
to construct an international power line from a proposed power plant located in Washington State to a
BC Hydro substation just north of the Canadian border, a plant which would “emit over 800 tons of
pollutants annually into the Fraser Valley airshed.”610 The Court held that while the NEB did not have
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authority to consider the effects of the plant that occurred in the US as it could not enforce mitigation
measures there, it did have jurisdiction to consider the environmental impacts that occurred in Canada,
and could refuse to issue the CPCN on those grounds.611 Likewise, in Friends of the West Country
Association, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the possibility that construction or operation of
roads or bridges over non-navigable waters could have cumulative adverse environmental effects
“demonstrates why it is logical that a cumulative effects assessment under paragraph 16(1)(a) not be
restricted to the scope of the federal project or to projects only under federal jurisdiction.”612
In MiningWatch Canada, Rothstein J. for the Supreme Court went so far as to hold that federal
authorities were required to consider all associated project components in an EA, not only those
components requiring authorization under federal statutes, due to the legislative scheme involved.613
The proponent was seeking to develop an open pit copper and gold mine and mill operation in
northwestern British Columbia, which included the mine itself, a tailings pond, access roads, water
diversion system, transmission lines, explosives storage and ancillary facilities.614 The responsible
authority subsequently determined that the scope of the project for the purposes of the federal EA
would not include the mine or mill, which meant that a less rigorous assessment process would apply.615
The Court held that under CEAA, responsible authorities did not have discretion to scope projects more
narrowly than that described by proponents, but instead must accept the scope of project as described
in its entirety.616 Further, the Court rejected the notion that avoidance of duplication was justification
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for a narrow scope of project, as duplication could be avoided through the cooperation mechanisms
offered under CEAA.617
While MiningWatch was decided on the basis of the language of CEAA and did not address the
question of jurisdiction, it is telling that the Court was aware that the purpose of the narrow scoping was
to focus only on areas within federal statutory authority and did not give any indication of concern that
doing so might intrude on provincial jurisdiction. Indeed, in Quebec (Attorney General) v Canada
(National Energy Board),618 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the scope of the National
Energy Board (NEB)’s EA must be limited to those matters within federal jurisdiction, and determined
that the NEB was authorized to consider the environmental effects of provincially-regulated energy
generation facilities when deciding on granting licences for export of electrical power to the U.S.
Applying Oldman, the Court held:
If in applying this Act the Board finds environmental effects within a province relevant to its
decision to grant an export licence, a matter of federal jurisdiction, it is entitled to consider those
effects. So too may the province have, within its proper contemplation, the environmental effects
of the provincially regulated aspects of such a project. This co-existence of responsibility is
neither unusual nor unworkable. While duplication and contradiction of directives should of
course be minimized, it is precisely this dilemma that the EARP Guidelines Order, specifically ss.
5 and 8, is designed to avoid, and that the Board attempted to reduce with the imposition of
conditions 10 and 11 to the licences.
It is also worth noting that the Board is the forum in which the environmental impact attributable
solely to the export, that is, to the impact of the increase in power output needed to service the
export contracts, will be considered. A focused assessment of these effects may be lost if
subsumed in a comprehensive evaluation by the province of the environmental effects of the
projects in their totality. In this way, both levels of government have a unique sphere in which to
contribute to environmental impact assessment.619
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As a result, the Court found that it was intra vires the NEB’s power to consider the future effects of
provincial power generation, and attach conditions related to environmental protection when issuing
export licenses.620
These cases demonstrate that the federal government has power to scope the project broadly,
regardless of whether the components and activities studied themselves fall under federal jurisdiction.
This approach is consistent with assessing a broad scope of factors, and follows the same logic that
scoping the project broadly will result in more informed decisions.621 According to Stacey, restricting
what may be considered in an assessment would cause decision-makers to “base his or her decision on a
restricted understanding of environmental effects,” and it is “unlikely that such a narrow understanding
of environmental effects can provide a sufficient basis for determining whether a project can be justified
in the circumstances.”622 In Forest Ethics Advocacy, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a NEB ruling to
not consider the environmental and socio-economic effects of upstream activities when assessing a
pipeline.623 However, as Chalifour notes, the decision was based on administrative law principles, not
constitutional authority, and the court applied a standard of reasonableness to the NEB’s decision,
giving it a high degree of deference.624 It was also relevant for the court that the legislative framework
did not require consideration of those broader factors;625 in other words, at issue was not whether the
NEB was able to assess the project’s upstream activities, but whether it had to. The court held that
decision-makers must be granted “leeway” to determine the relevance of a consideration.626
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Accordingly, it appears that the limits of federal authority when scoping assessments is based on the
administrative, rather than constitutional, principle of relevance to the project. What components and
activities are deemed relevant to a project will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, but
previous case law suggests that a valid scope may include all direct components and activities,627 future
facilities,628 upstream power generation,629 facilities or activities in other jurisdictions that may result in
federal effects,630 and project-related marine shipping.631
Additionally, it is instructive that the Supreme Court in MiningWatch rejected the argument that
duplication with provincial reviews was a valid reason to focus the scope only on components within
federal jurisdiction.632 Next generation EA recognizes that EA has multijurisdictional implications due to
overlapping legislative environmental responsibilities, and that intergovernmental coordination is
required in order to minimize duplication, enhance certainty and efficiency, and advance
sustainability.633 It does so by requiring assessment authorities to collaborate upward with other
jurisdictions in the development of assessment processes and in efforts to reach consensus on
decisions.634 As discussed in Chapter III, courts will use cooperative federalism as an interpretive aid
when considering whether legislation upsets the balance of power,635 and the emphasis in next
generation EA may assuage a court’s concerns that an assessment has scoped in provincial effects and
provincially-regulated components and activities. While cooperative federalism cannot be relied upon to
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“make ultra vires legislation intra vires,”636 courts “should avoid blocking the application of measures
which are taken to be enacted in furtherance of the public interest.”637 Given the importance of EA as a
tool for furthering the public interest through a careful and comprehensive weighing of the benefits,
risks, impacts and uncertainties of proposals,638 and the fact that (as noted in the triggering section
above) courts have declined to interfere with assessment processes until there is a decision with legal
consequences,639 it stands to reason that a court would accommodate a scope of federal EA that
overlaps with provincial jurisdiction, especially in light of efforts under a next generation EA law to
collaborate with provincial jurisdictions to minimize duplication and facilitate intergovernmental
dialogue. As a result, it is quite likely that a court would find that where a federal assessment has been
validly triggered, a federal authority will have jurisdiction to consider all of a project’s environmental
and socio-economic implications, and the implications of all relevant direct, upstream and downstream
activities related to the project.
Regional and Strategic EA

As with project EA, the scope of projects, activities and effects that may be considered in federal RA and
SA is likely broad. Given that all effects should be assumed to be cumulative until proven otherwise,640
even projects and effects that individually would not normally be assumed to fall within provincial
jurisdiction have potential to impact cumulatively on areas of federal authority, or to interact with
effects that do fall within federal power and augment them. Also, as SA and RA are strategic tools for
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identifying pathways towards desired futures,641 it is logical that federal authorities have jurisdiction to
assess all relevant positive and negative environmental and socio-economic effects in order to inform
the identification of those desired futures and pathways.642 For example, if the federal government
sought to understand and make decisions respecting cumulative effects in a region on areas within its
authority – for example, fisheries – it would need to examine and address all activities that contribute to
cumulative effects, as well as all other environmental and socio-economic effects of those activities in
order to make fully-informed decisions about the pace and scale of impacts on and management of
fisheries in that region. Similarly, while the pace and scale of the development of natural resources is
within provincial authority,643 identifying and assessing possible future development scenarios644 is
required to understand the range of potential future federal effects.
Accordingly, the SATCM should be able to validly consider the full range of effects related to
thermal coal mining and related upstream and downstream activities. For example, thermal coal mined
in Canada is currently exported through Canadian ports,645 and assessing the impacts of the marine
shipping of those exports is a valid exercise of federal authority.646 It is logical that a federal authority
may wish to understand the impacts of thermal coal mining and shipping in the context of the impacts
of transporting the coal from the mining and milling operations to the ports for export. Assessing the full
range of activities within alternative development scenarios would likewise enrich federal understanding
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of the environmental and socio-economic contexts related to impacts on federal matters647 and the full
extent of the cumulative effects of those activities.648 Similarly, there should be no limits on the scope of
activities and effects that may be considered in the Ring of Fire RA, given the interactive nature of
effects and the significant potential for impacts of proposed or foreseeable activities on federal
matters.649 Assessing the pace and scale of different development scenarios within the region would be
relevant to federal authorities’ understanding of the different impacts on areas of federal jurisdiction
and management options to ensure the sustainability of those impacts.650 The scope of the RA would in
and of itself have no legal consequence for proponents or the provinces,651 and a court would likely not
interfere with scoping decisions made during a RA or SA. Additionally, as with project EA, attempts by
federal authorities to cooperate with provincial jurisdictions would help avoid perceptions that the
assessment is intruding into provincial constitutional territory.

c) Decision-making
Project EA

The decision stage of assessments is likely the area that requires the strongest degree of federal
jurisdiction. Decision-making is, of course, about determining whether a project should or should not
proceed,652 although Sinclair et al. prefer to frame the ultimate decision as being “about favouring good
projects and sending clear signals that good sustainability-enhancing projects will receive favourable
reviews – attracting the right kind of proponents proposing the right kind of projects.”653 Decisions
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should be accompanied by explicit reasons that include justification for any trade-offs.654 They can also
include the imposition of any conditions on an approval, and should establish requirements for project
monitoring and follow-up.655 Indeed, both CEAA 2012 and the IAA require the decision-maker to
establish any binding conditions on a project approval that she or he deems appropriate, are directly
linked or necessarily incidental to the exercise of federal authority, and that include conditions
respecting the implementation of mitigation measures and a follow-up program.656 Conditions of
approval may involve modifications to project design or siting, or select alternatives to the original
proposal in order to reduce environmental risk and enhance benefits.657 Monitoring should help identify
whether conditions of approval are being met and fulfilled, whether the project is “living up to its
promise of making a net contribution to sustainability,” as well as whether it is resulting in any
unanticipated effects that require addressing.658 As with the scope of the assessment, monitoring and
follow-up should focus not just on biophysical environmental effects, but also on any effects on the
public, and especially vulnerable communities.659
The basic jurisdictional questions related to decision-making are the extent to which a federal
decision must be rooted in federal jurisdiction (i.e., federal impact or valid exercise of federal authority,
such as federal proponency, federal funding, ownership of lands or regulation of the project itself, such
as railways) and the extent to which it may encroach on provincial matters. If as concluded above the
scope of factors that may be considered in a federal EA is limitless, is the scope of factors that may be
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relied on in decision-making similarly so? What is the appropriate constitutional balance between
addressing impacts on or resulting from federal matters and respecting provincial authority? To what
extent may a federal authority prefer an alternative to a proposed undertaking (including the null
alternative) or impose conditions on approval, including monitoring and follow-up, where conditions
may act as a bar to projects or relate to provincial matters? Could a federal authority revoke a project
approval on the basis that a condition pertaining to a provincial matter is not being met or provincial
effects are not as predicted?
Having established at the outset of this chapter that next generation federal EA legislation
would likely fall under the various heads of power to which an undertaking pertains, it follows that
federal decision-making authority under EA legislation also stems from the head (or heads) of power
involved. However, while it was relevant for La Forest J that the EARPGO simply expanded on the factors
that decision-makers must consider when exercising their discretion under other statutes,660 it should be
noted that it is the Constitution, not federal laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution, that confers
jurisdictional authority. An assertion of federal regulatory authority may in fact be ultra vires federal
jurisdiction, and the suite of federal environmental regulatory requirements may not comprehensively
cover all areas of federal jurisdiction. For example, should Parliament repeal the Canadian Navigable
Waters Act661 it would still have jurisdiction over navigation under section 91(10) and would therefore
have authority to decide whether to approve impacts on navigation or the impacts of navigation
projects.662 Conversely, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fowler and Northwest Falling suggest that
where the assessment reveals no impacts on a federal power Parliament would be unable to reject or
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impose conditions on a project, as those decisions would fall outside its constitutional authority to do
so.663 As La Forest J. asserted, an assessment authority cannot use EA “as a colourable device to invade
areas of provincial jurisdiction.”664
Where a federal authority exercises a power or an EA reveals impacts on areas of federal
authority, La Forest J. suggests that authorities may consider effects that are merely incidental to the
federal effect or decision involved. He referred to Australian case Murphyores, in which the Court held
that the Australian federal Minister for Minerals and Energy was authorized to consider the
environmental impact of mineral extraction when considering whether to approve the minerals’ export,
even though it is the state governments in Australia who regulate mineral extraction, and environmental
effects related to the minerals is incidental to the exercise of federal authority over exports.665 Thus,
non-federal effects that are incidental to the federal head invoked by the undertaking are valid
considerations. Indeed, La Forest J. warns against “the danger of falling into the conceptual trap of
thinking of the environment as an extraneous matter in making legislative choices or administrative
decisions,” and states that the environment in its broadest conceptualization “must be a part of what
actuates many decisions of any moment.”666 Any intrusion into matters within provincial authority is
incidental to the pith and substance of next generation federal EA,667 which (as found above) could, with
some tailoring to focus assessments on federal projects or impacts, be defined as a tool for ensuring the
sustainability of matters within federal authority and upheld under various heads of federal power. As
La Forest J. held in Oldman:
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In legislating regarding a subject, it is sufficient that the legislative body legislate on that subject.
The practical purpose that inspires the legislation and the implications that body must consider
in making its decision are another thing. Absent a colourable purpose or a lack of bona fides,
these considerations will not detract from the fundamental nature of the legislation. A railway
line may be required to locate so as to avoid a nuisance resulting from smoke or noise in a
municipality, but it is nonetheless railway regulation.668
In other words, there is a distinction between legislating on a matter and making decisions pursuant to
that legislation.669 If next generation federal EA legislation is intra vires Parliament’s authority, decisionmakers may validly consider information beyond that which relates to the head of power involved. As La
Forest J. recognized, projects impacting a federal matter or requiring a federal authorization rarely
improve the matter over which Parliament has the authority.670 Environmental decision-making thus
inherently entails justifying negative impacts through the activity’s benefits, including those that do not
fall within federal authority, such as local jobs or other socio-economic benefits.671
While Oldman casts some doubt as to the extent to which federal decision-makers may consider
adverse impacts beyond those that are federal in nature,672 the 2004 Supreme Court Canadian Forest
Products (CanFor)673 case suggests that scope is broad. CanFor was an appeal of a decision respecting
damages owed by a logging company to British Columbia arising out of its negligence. In particular, the
Court was asked to quantify the environmental cost of losing non-commercial, protected trees due to a
wildfire.674 Binnie J. for a majority of the Court noted expert testimony at trial that the loss of the trees
could result in ecological impacts such as watershed degradation and financial losses resulting from less
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tourism and sport fishing, and held that the Crown may claim damages for environmental harms.675
While he highlighted the need for evidence respecting the economic quantification of ecosystem
services,676 the case is important for its recognition of the fact that impacts on one component of the
environment can have ripple effects across other environmental or socio-economic factors, from
species’ habitats, biodiversity, regulation of systems like water and soil erosion, and the recreational or
emotional benefits people may derive from the component or its contribution to a healthy
environment.677 Those ecosystem services may have “use value,” or the value humans derive from
services they use, like drinking water and food. They may have “existence value,” which is the value
derived from knowing an environmental component or ecosystem exists even if a person does not
directly use it (such as a protected area one may nor may not visit in the future). And they may have
“inherent value,” which is the non-human value of ecosystems.678 Navigation and fisheries are two such
ecosystem services, and when proponents seek permission to impact those matters they are in effect
seeking permission to use those services, which may come at a public cost. It is only logical, then, that
when deciding whether to allocate ecosystem services to a proponent, a federal authority should
consider whether that allocation is warranted in light of all of the project’s impacts, benefits, risks and
uncertainties,679 as it is in doing so that decision-makers have the comprehensive “objective basis” for
decisions described by La Forest J. in Oldman.680 Similarly, when the federal government is regulating a
project like a railway, it is rational and proper for it to consider all implications of its decision and impose
restrictions accordingly.681 As Olszynski states, a federal authority “might be more willing to authorize
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the fishery impacts associated with a hospital than with a casino… [and] may be more inclined to
authorize fishery impacts associated with a project that is more consistent with the principles of
sustainable development than one that is not.”682
As confirmed by a majority of the Supreme Court in Moses, the federal government has
authority to reject projects impacting on federal matters even where those projects also fall under
provincial jurisdiction, such as mines,683 and it is immaterial that the decision also impacts on a
provincial matter.684 Where such impacts exist, it is only reasonable that federal decision-makers may
apply criteria designed to reduce unwanted impacts and enhance benefits685 in order to decide whether
and under what circumstances federal impacts are warranted. In fact, it may be through the application
of such criteria that a federal authority finds a federal impact to be warranted, for example by preferring
an alternative that enhances a provincial benefit or minimizes an additional provincial impact. Selecting
an alternative would be less of an intrusion into an area of provincial authority than an outright
rejection and would therefore indicate an attempt by the federal government to respect the balance of
powers. As Doelle argues, “[i]t does not serve to protect provincial jurisdiction to force the federal
decision, whether or not to approve an impact on navigation, to be made in a partially blind manner.”686
Likewise, it does not serve to protect provincial jurisdiction to restrict federal ability to find mutuallyacceptable ways to allow projects to proceed.
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Similarly, it is logical that federal authority over the subject matters assigned to it under section
91 includes authority to impose conditions respecting provincial matters. Where a federal authority
imposes more stringent conditions of approval than the province, there will be no conflict so long as the
proponent can comply with the stricter conditions.687 If a proponent cannot comply with a condition or
if provincial and federal conditions conflict, the federal decision prevails.688 The question is the extent to
which a federal authority can impose conditions respecting provincial matters or conditions that the
proponent cannot meet, or when might a decision to reject a project or impose conditions respecting
provincial matters be seen as an unlawful intrusion into provincial jurisdiction.689
Kennett argues that it would be colourable for the federal government to refuse a project in the
absence of “negative consequence for matters of federal jurisdiction,” or to attach to an approval
conditions unrelated to federal constitutional authority.690 As noted above, the colourability doctrine is
aimed at preventing legislators from “do[ing something] indirectly what [they] cannot do directly.”691
The Supreme Court in the Firearms Reference held that a law may be “colourable if its stated purposes
diverge substantially from its actual effects.”692 However, the Court has also held that the colourability
doctrine only applies to the threshold question of whether impugned legislation is in pith and substance
in relation to a federal matter, and that where the legislation validly relates to a federal matter, the
question is in respect to its applicability rather than colourability.693 In the Firearms Reference the Court
also held that the provincial effects of a federal law may be “so substantial that they show that the law
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is mainly, or “in pith and substance” the regulation” of a matter within provincial jurisdiction.694 The
same test likely applies to decisions made pursuant to legislation: whether the purpose and effects of a
decision are mainly in relation to a federal matter, and if so, whether it and any conditions and follow-up
are based on relevant considerations and do not intrude so far into provincial jurisdiction as to “erode
the constitutional balance inherent in the Canadian federal state.”695 In other words, federal authority to
impact on provincial matters depends on the degree of impact on the area within federal authority and
the degree of intrusion into the provincial arena. The Supreme Court has made it clear that an exercise
of federal authority may have incidental effects on provincial jurisdiction that are “of significant practical
importance” so long as they “are collateral and secondary to the mandate of the enacting legislature.”696
As seen in Ward in Chapter II, the Supreme Court upheld a Fisheries Act provision prohibiting the sale of
hooded and harp seals, even though it was aimed at commerce rather than hunting, finding that the
purpose of the impugned provision was to discourage their killing and therefore within federal fisheries
power.697 Accordingly, so long as the effects of a federal decision are collateral to a valid federal
purpose,698 they should not render that decision invalid. If a mine’s impacts on fisheries are
inconsequential and the burden on the proponent to relocate the mine is great, a court may find that
the federal government has overstepped its jurisdiction, but where the impacts on fisheries are
significant, the effects on provincial jurisdiction may be considered incidental.
For example, since the federal government has authority to reject a mine on the basis of effects
on a federal fishery,699 and since (as set out above) the enhancement of jobs or mitigation of provincial
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effects may be relevant to a federal determination respecting whether the mine’s federal effects are
warranted, it would likely be appropriate for a federal authority to impose conditions respecting the
enhancement of jobs or mitigation of additional provincial impacts. Given that the alternative would be
to permit the federal government to reject a project based on federal impacts, as La Forest J. held, it
would defy reason to bar it from imposing conditions that would result in an approval.700 This logic may
be extended to post-decision monitoring and follow-up: if a federal authority is acting within the bounds
of federal jurisdiction in making decisions in light of all relevant impacts and in imposing conditions on
approval, it stands to reason that federal authorities may monitor effects to ensure they are as
predicted, monitor conditions to ensure they are being followed, and address any findings of noncompliance or effects that are not as predicted.701
On the other hand, courts will be live to provincial sensitivities702 and the need to ensure that
federal decisions do not upset the balance of power. A less clear situation may be where provincial
interest in the project is high, such as a provincial utility like a wind farm. If due to the size, siting and
design of the wind farm the federal effects will be minimal and the project is necessary to meet the
province’s energy needs, a court may find that a federal rejection on the basis of those minimal federal
impacts to be an unconstitutional intrusion into provincial authority that “override[s] or modif[es] the
separation of powers”703 and that the purpose and effect of a federal rejection are mainly in relation to
a provincial matter.704 In such a situation, the paramountcy or interjurisdictional immunity doctrines
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would not apply, as both require laws to be otherwise valid,705 which would not be the case if a
decision’s purpose and effects are primarily in relation to a provincial matter. Additionally, those
doctrines apply to statutes and legislative provisions, rather than decisions made under such legislation.
While the Supreme Court in Canadian Western Bank indicated an intention for courts to play a limited
role in protecting the balance of power out of a concern that the allocation of powers will be informed
by politics and should therefore be left to the political orders of government,706 it did state that there is
a role for courts to facilitate cooperative federalism and ensure that the balance of power is
maintained.707
Federalism has featured prominently in environmental division of powers cases, and as with
other cases, courts have demonstrated a preference for respecting the division while maintaining a
flexible approach that allows both orders of government to address emerging environmental issues. In
his dissent in Crown Zellerbach, La Forest J. expressed concerns with the majority’s decision to uphold
the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act, SC 1974-75-76, c 55, which regulated the dumping of
substances at sea, under the federal POGG power:
It must be remembered that the peace, order and good government clause may comprise not
only prohibitions, like criminal law, but regulation. Regulation to control pollution, which is
incidentally only part of the even larger global problem of managing the environment, could
arguably include not only emission standards but the control of the substances used in
manufacture, as well as the techniques of production generally, in so far as these may have an
impact on pollution. This has profound implications for the federal-provincial balance mandated
by the Constitution. The challenge for the courts, as in the past, will be to allow the federal
Parliament sufficient scope to acquit itself of its duties to deal with national and international
problems while respecting the scheme of federalism provided by the Constitution.708
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Justice La Forest’s concern was that the provinces would not have concurrent authority over marine
pollution under a head of provincial power.709 To uphold the legislation under POGG, La Forest stated,
would “create considerable stress on Canadian federalism as it has developed over the years,”710 as it
risks allocating environmental pollution broadly and exclusively to the federal Parliament, which would
“involve sacrificing the principles of federalism enshrined in the Constitution.”711 In the subsequent case
of Hydro-Québec, La Forest J. (this time writing for the majority), addressed these concerns by upholding
provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, RSC, 1985, c 16 (4th Supp) (CEPA) as well as an
order made under that Act not under POGG, but under the federal criminal law power. In doing so, the
majority recognized the “superordinate importance” of both federal and provincial legislative measures
to protect the environment.712 That importance, it found, requires courts to define the extent to which
each level of government may use those powers progressively, “in a manner that is fully responsive to
emerging realities and to the nature of the subject matter sought to be regulated.”713
Justice La Forest held that the Constitution “should be so interpreted as to afford both levels of
government ample means to protect the environment while maintaining the general structure of the
Constitution.”714 He wrote:
… each constitutional head of power has its own particular characteristics and raises concerns
peculiar to itself in assessing it in the balance of Canadian federalism. This may seem obvious,
perhaps even trite, but it is all too easy (see R. v. Fowler, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.)) to overlook
the characteristics of a particular power and overshoot the mark or, again, in assessing the
applicability of one head of power to give effect to concerns appropriate to another head of
power when this is neither appropriate nor consistent with the law laid down by this Court
respecting the ambit and contours of that other power. In the present case, it seems to me, this
709
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was the case of certain propositions placed before us regarding the breadth and application of
the criminal law power. There was a marked attempt to raise concerns appropriate to the
national concern doctrine under the peace, order and good government clause to the criminal
law power in a manner that, in my view, is wholly inconsistent with the nature and ambit of that
power as set down by this Court from a very early period and continually reiterated since,
notably in specific pronouncements in the most recent cases on the subject.715
Justice La Forest went on to address the concern he expressed in Crown Zellerbach over the possibility
of allocating exclusive legislative power over the environment to the federal Parliament, noting that he
“would be equally concerned with an interpretation of the Constitution that effectively allocated to the
provinces, under general powers such as property and civil rights, control over the environment in a
manner that prevented Parliament from exercising the leadership role expected of it.”716 Due to the
“sweeping” nature of environmental pollution, care must be taken to respect the division of powers and
preserve the ability of both orders of government to “exercise leadership” in environmental
protection.717 Influencing La Forest J.’s decision was the fact that CEPA largely only restricted, rather
than prohibited, toxic substances, and therefore “limited provincial jurisdiction must less than it would if
it were primarily prohibitory.”718 Also, unlike upholding the Ocean Dumping Control Act under POGG in
Crown Zellerbach, upholding CEPA under the criminal law power maintained provincial authority to
manage toxic substances concurrently.719 Indeed, La Forest J. noted how “in enacting the legislation in
issue here, Parliament was alive to the need for cooperation and coordination between the federal and
provincial authorities.”720
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In Oldman, the third of La Forest J.’s trilogy of environmental division of powers cases, as noted
above he rejected the interjurisdictional immunity argument that projects should be classified as “a
“provincial project” or an undertaking “primarily subject to provincial regulation.”721 Through this
recognition of the multifaceted nature of the environment (and EA) and the need for both orders of
government to share responsibility for it through their respective heads of power, La Forest J. advanced
the notion that for efforts towards environmental protection to be effective and to advance federalism
principles, the courts should facilitate “integrated approach[es] to environmental management.”722 This
cooperative federalism model has been more recently cited by courts when upholding federal carbon
pricing legislation: in the Saskatchewan Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act Reference,723 the
dissenting reasons of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered the principle of cooperative
federalism in holding that the federal legislation is invalid.724 The minority referred to federalism and
constitutional balance as “normative and organising principles of constitutional interpretation,” and
described cooperative federalism as an interpretive tool for allowing “room for flexibility, overlapping
jurisdictions and intergovernmental cooperation in a division of power analysis.”725 Similarly, a majority
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in its Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act cited the
principle of cooperative federalism in upholding the federal act.726 The majority held that cooperative
federalism “does support the concurrent operation of statutes enacted by governments at both levels,”
which the legislation in question encourages.727
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The above cases indicate that while cooperative federalism cannot be used to uphold legislation
that is otherwise ultra vires the enacting government, it is a powerful tool for accommodating overlap,
especially where governments are working together or the legislative scheme recognizes the authority
of the other order of government and makes efforts to minimalize intrusion and offer means of
intergovernmental cooperation, as is the case with next generation EA.728 Accordingly, in the example of
the wind farm above, a court may find that a federal authority has jurisdiction to reject the farm in
favour of an alternative if it does so in cooperation with a provincial authority that reaches the same
decision (and the challenge is brought by a non-state actor, such as a citizen’s group), since doing so
would foster cooperation and avoid legislative vacuums.729
Additionally, even where the assessment isn’t coordinated but federal impacts may be
significant – for example, on migratory birds – and there is a technically and economically feasible
alternative (such as demand-side management or alternative electrification that is not contrary to
provincial policy),730 a court may find that the purpose and effects are mainly in relation to that federal
matter and therefore that it is within federal authority to approve that alternative over the project as
proposed by the provincial utility. The extent of federal authority with respect to follow-up would also
be tied to the extent of federal effects versus degree of federal interest: for example, in the case of the
wind project it may be valid for a federal authority to require a proponent to monitor impacts on
migratory birds where the assessment has indicated such effects will occur and address findings that the
impacts are greater than predicted, but it may not have authority to order the wind farm to close due to
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unpredicted noise causing a nuisance for local residents that cannot be mitigated. This approach is
consistent with the double aspect doctrine, which (as discussed above) allows for the concurrent
application of both federal and provincial legislation,731 and decisions made pursuant to that legislation,
provided the two do not conflict. When exactly a federal decision crosses the line from valid incidental
effects on provincial authority to unconstitutional intrusion into provincial jurisdiction and an upset to
the balance of Canadian federalism will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, in light of the
particular facts of each situation.
Regional and Strategic EA

Again, the above principles would apply with respect of regional and strategic EA. Chapter II posed the
question of the extent of federal authority to direct the pace and scale of development of a particular
kind or in a particular region, and whether there are any limits to the information federal authorities
may consider when developing the outcomes of RA and SA. The above analysis suggests that while
provinces have jurisdiction over the management of natural resources on provincial lands,732 federal
authorities have jurisdiction to regulate the pace and scale of impacts on areas of federal jurisdiction
and activities over which Parliament has been assigned authority under section 91 of The Constitution
Act, 1867.733 So long as the purpose and effect of RA and SA outcomes are mainly in relation to federal
matters, they may incidentally affect the provincial sphere, such as natural resource management.734 For
example, the Ring of Fire RA may result in the identification of a preferred vision of the future of
fisheries in the region and preferred scenarios related to those fisheries.735 So long as the RA outcomes
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pertain to federal matters,736 it is constitutionally irrelevant whether they are based on provincial
considerations like socio-economic conditions and opportunities, air pollution or impacts on nonAboriginal hunting and fishing.737 Indeed, as with project assessment, it is only rational that a federal
authority would consider the full range of predicted impacts, benefits, risks and uncertainties of
different scenarios in order to make fully-informed decisions respecting the future allocation of
ecosystem services within its authority.738
It should also be noted that in next generation EA, regional and strategic assessment merely
result in “authoritative guidance” for project assessment.739 Tools for informing and guiding project-level
decision-making,740 RA and SA do not themselves result in decisions respecting individual projects. So
long as RA and SA decisions are not binding on provinces and individual proponents, courts may be
reluctant to weigh in on their constitutionality just as they are reluctant to weigh in on questions related
to project assessment reports741 and instead decide it is appropriate to wait until decisions are made
that affect legal rights or interests – in other words, at the project level. Of course, it could be argued
that a federal policy to ban all projects of a particular type would be ultra vires the federal Parliament if
that project type was provincially-regulated, but that such a ban would either need to be made in a
legally-binding instrument or be found to have such a deterrent effect on proponents that it has the
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effect of a legal ban. In such cases, as with project assessment, federal jurisdiction will hinge on whether
the purpose and effect of such a ban are mainly in relation to a federal matter.742 The SATCM may be
illuminating: if, for example, the SATCM resulted in a ban on thermal coal mining, a provincial legislature
may argue that such outcomes are unconstitutional intrusions into provincial authority. However, if the
SATCM resulted in a decision that the federal impacts of thermal coal mining and export were
unavoidable, un-mitigatable and unwarranted in light of all the project’s impacts, and resulted in a ban
on future exports of thermal coal (a federal matter)743 and direction to federal authorities to not
authorize federal impacts of thermal coal mining – in other words, so long as the ban is implemented
through valid exercises of federal authority (i.e., by prohibiting federal impacts on a project-by-project
basis) – its purpose and effects would appear to be mainly in relation to a federal matter. Determining
whether the ban imbalanced the division of powers by intruding too far into provincial jurisdiction
would depend on the particular facts on a project-by-project basis: as with project assessment, a court
would likely look at the degree to which a federal decision is integrated with a federal matter and the
“seriousness of the encroachment on provincial powers,”744 as well as efforts to cooperate with
provincial jurisdictions.
Thus, RA and SA may be tiered with project assessment by providing direction to authorities
relating to federal matters, and being informed by other assessments at all levels.745 They may also
inform federal planning with respect to federal matters, such as the pace and scale of development of
federally-regulated undertakings (such as railways)746 or the pace and scale of impacts on federal
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matters, such as fisheries. Similarly, they may result in federal policies, plans or programs; indeed, as
with EA under the EARPGO, SA and RA may be conceptualized as simply a tool for informing federal
creation of policies, plans and programs under its constitutional authority.747 Where a federal and
provincial policy, plan or program (including a preferred scenario respecting federal matters versus a
provincial preferred scenario respecting development) conflict, a court will have to look at the doctrines
pertaining to the division of powers, such as interjurisdictional immunity, paramountcy and the double
aspect doctrine. Take a hypothetical example of a federal strategic assessment of marine shipping along
BC’s northwest coast that results in a policy to not approve marine vessels above a certain size due to
impacts on endangered orcas – including liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers – and a provincial policy in
BC to promote LNG production and export. Orcas fall under the federal fisheries power,748 and the
strategic assessment may find that impacts of LNG shipping on them are significant due to their
threatened status.749 In such a case the federal policy’s purpose and effects would likely be found to be
mainly in relation to federal matters, and it would be immaterial whether the policy is actually effective
at protecting the orcas.750 Further, federal authorities may find that but for adverse provincial effects of
the LNG facilities – e.g., localized air pollution and the health and gendered impacts of workers’ camps –
the projects benefits would justify the impacts on orcas, and ban LNG shipping due to the impacts on
orcas in light of all provincial impacts and benefits. As with EARPGO, the SA would have simply “added
to the matters that federal decision-maker should consider.751 However, a federal policy respecting
electrical generation within a province that runs contrary to that province’s own electrification policy
may be found to have upset the balance of powers if the intrusion is considerable and the purpose of
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the federal policy is not mainly in relation to a federal matter. For example, a federal policy to prefer
wind over solar electricity in a province, where the federal impacts of wind are found to be greater than
those of solar and the primary reason for the federal policy is local opposition to solar in politically
significant ridings for the government of the day, the purpose and effects of the policy may be found to
be mainly in relation to a provincial matter (generation and production of electrical energy).752 Again,
the balance of impacts on areas within federal authority versus the intrusion into provincial matters will
be key, as will be efforts to cooperate with provincial jurisdictions, as courts seek to maintain a flexible
approach to division of powers cases that allows both orders of government to address emerging
environmental issues.
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V.

Conclusions

Four main conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. The first is that a federal next generation
EA statute would need to be drafted in such a way as to make it in “relation to” one or more federal
heads of power. The EARPGO simply set out a process for how federal decision-makers had to exercise
their authority under various heads of power,753 and could therefore be upheld under those heads.754
The IAA is rooted in federal jurisdiction primarily through its decision-making function in section 60,
which requires decision-makers to determine whether the adverse federal, direct or indirect effects are
in the public interest, as well as purposes related to federal matters and a prohibition that also focuses
on federal effects.755 Were a next generation EA law to apply to undertakings with potential for federal
impacts and similarly focus its decision-making on federal impacts, it would likely be upheld under
various federal heads of power.
The second main conclusion is that it is at the decision-making phase that federal jurisdiction
becomes most important. Courts have expressed a reluctance to interfere with assessments before a
decision has been made that carries legal consequences,756 and while a federal decision to trigger an
assessment of a project with no possibility of federal effects or other federal jurisdictional hook may
constitute an improper intrusion into provincial jurisdiction, EA should be triggered early, before
authorities may have information about an undertaking’s potential effects.757 Also, because the suite of
federal environmental regulatory processes may not capture all federal impacts and undertakings,
authority to require an EA should not be limited to the EARPGO-style regulatory triggers.758 Given the
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need for precaution and the mechanisms available to authorities to avoid duplication and tailor
assessments to the scope of potential federal impacts, the jurisdictional threshold at the triggering stage
should be low, such as the reasonable probability of federal impacts. At the strategic and regional tiers,
this threshold will capture a wide range of undertakings, given the compounding nature of cumulative
effects.759
Rather, it is in decision-making that the EA must be rooted in federal constitutional authority.
Where an assessment reveals no impacts on federal matters and there is no other federal involvement
(such as a federal proponent, federal funding or federal lands), there will exist no jurisdiction on which
to base a decision. On the other hand, where federal impacts will occur, the federal government will
have authority to approve or reject the project, impose conditions and require follow-up.760 Federal
jurisdiction in such cases will not be unlimited: courts will seek to maintain the balance of powers by
ensuring that the purpose and effects of federal decisions are in relation to federal matters, and will
therefore weigh the magnitude of federal impacts against the degree of intrusion into provincial
jurisdiction.761 Where the assessment reveals only minimal federal effects and there are no other federal
jurisdictional hooks, federal authorities will have little authority to reject or impose stringent conditions.
But where federal effects occur, authorities may make decisions that incidentally affect provincial
matters.762 For regional and strategic assessments, federal authorities will similarly need to ensure that
outcomes focus on federal constitutional authority, such as the pace and scale of federal impacts, or
policies, plans and programs respecting federal issues.
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Third, the scope of factors a federal decision-maker may consider when making decisions
respecting federal effects is broad, limited only to those considerations that are relevant to the
undertaking. The case law suggests that assessments may be scoped to include a wide range of
upstream, direct and downstream effects and project components, such as future facilities and facilities
in other jurisdictions, upstream production and electrification, and downstream marine shipping.763
Also, given the interactive nature of effects and the ecosystem and social services that environmental
matters provide,764 it is only logical that federal jurisdiction related to the various section 91 subjectmatters includes the power to consider all relevant environmental, social and economic (including
health) implications of undertakings that affect those matters.765 For example, when deciding whether
to authorize impacts on fisheries, a federal minister may find it relevant to consider the benefits
associated with those impacts, and may also deem non-federal adverse impacts relevant to the overall
cost-benefit analysis.766 In fact, it may be through the weighing of the overall impacts, benefits, risks and
uncertainties that federal authorities find themselves able to justify federal effects and minimize their
intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. So long as the purpose and effect of federal decisions relate mainly
to federal heads of power, any overlap with provincial jurisdiction “is just what would be expected in a
federation such as Canada.”767
Finally, next generation EA’s emphasis on multijurisdictional collaboration interacts with the
court’s preference in recent decades for cooperative federalism and the need for ‘all hands on deck’
when it comes to environmental protection. The environment touches on multiple heads of power
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accorded to both orders of government, and courts are unlikely to draw “bright jurisdictional lines”
between federal and provincial power to assess matters.768 As Baier states, “[i]f a protester’s placard
were to read, ‘the environment belongs to no one and to everyone’ it would be as much an observation
about constitutional jurisdiction in Canada as it would be Earth-friendly philosophy.”769 Overlap in EA is
not of itself a good or a bad thing,770 and so long as triggering decisions are based on a reasonable
probability of impacts on areas within federal authority and decisions – including conditions of approval
and follow-up programs – are linked to direct or incidental impacts on matters falling within a head or
heads of federal power, Parliament should be accorded latitude to overlap into areas of provincial
concern. Where federal authorities seek to collaborate with provincial authorities early and throughout
assessments, courts may be more inclined to tolerate incidental effects on provincial matters. As
Saunders notes, “the purpose of federalism is not the elimination of conflict,” but rather
accommodation of overlap and conflict.771 Through multijurisdictional cooperation in next generation
EA, governments can seek consensus on process and final decisions, and where provincial authorities
are not willing to come to the table there would still be broad authority to ensure the sustainability of
federal activities and resources. To paraphrase Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Spraytech, our
common future depends on it.772
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